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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are major, externally observable and discretionary long-term 
investments that provide managers with opportunities for their incentives (e.g., hubris, personal risk 
reduction and perquisites) to diverge from the interests of shareholders (Bliss and Rosen, 2001). These 
potential agency problems can also be inferred from the links between asset growth through M&As and 
chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Jensen (1986) argues that managers can grow their firms 
beyond the optimal size, which brings about increased managerial power and better remuneration. Seo 
et al. (2015) find that relatively underpaid CEOs tend to engage in M&As to increase their pay to the 
level of their peers. However, theoretically and empirically, it remains unclear whether CEOs receive 
beneficial compensation through M&A activity. While Bliss and Rosen (2001), Grinstein and Hribar 
(2004), and Harford and Li (2007) find a positive effect of M&As on subsequent executive pay, Avery 
et al. (1998) find no such effect. To clarify the unsettled merger–pay relation, our paper investigates 
what private benefits in compensation accrue to CEOs by undertaking M&As. CEO compensation is 
estimated as a function of asset growth, market value and accounting profitability, among many other 
factors. To study the merger effect, we distinguish asset growth through M&As from non-merger 
internal growth. 
To examine the links between CEO compensation and M&A decisions, this paper focuses on the 
banking industry, which provides a natural laboratory on this issue. Minnick et al. (2011) argue that the 
role of regulatory supervision in banks can be a substitute for, or a complement of, internal corporate 
governance (e.g., CEO compensation), and that some specific governance issues (e.g., the relation 
between CEO compensation and M&As) that are valid in industrial firms may not be valid in banks 
(Adams and Mehran, 2003; Barth et al., 2004). The risk-shifting problem is particularly severe in banks 
because of their high leverage (John et al., 2010), which complicates the agency problems, making the 
effective design of executive compensation contracts, as a remedy to mitigate the problems, especially 
important. Furthermore, according to Minnick et al. (2011), the M&As made by banks are normally 
within the single financial industry and are thus not driven by industry rebalancing. The single industry 
study addresses the challenge of identifying industry sectors in fixed-effect regressions, as the industry 
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classifications may not be detailed enough. 
The banking industry in the United States is an appropriate setting for analysing the impact of 
M&As on CEO compensation arrangements for at least two reasons. First, the federal deregulations of 
the banking industry opened up new opportunities for banks to grow via M&As, leading to increased 
decision-making power of managers through controlling enlarged banks (Hope and Thomas, 2008; 
Jensen, 1986). The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 removed most 
restrictions on interstate bank M&As and allowed banks to open branches in multiple states. The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 eliminated the barriers that forbade 
commercial banks to merge with insurance underwriters, securities brokerages and investment banks. 
Following the creation of expanded investment sets for banks, a large amount of consolidation occurred. 
Second, the majority of debt holders of banks (i.e., dispersed depositors), who are insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), lack the incentive, as well as the ability, to monitor the actions 
of bank managers. It is thus likely that bank CEOs employ the expanded investment options via M&As 
to seek favourable compensation contracts. 
The U.S. banking industry exhibits different characteristics from non-financial industries and, 
hence, may exhibit different patterns when we examine the links between CEO compensation and 
M&As. First, the banking industry is heavily regulated, compared to non-financial industries. Becoming 
large is especially important for banks. M&As, as a means to achieve rapid size expansion, benefit bank 
shareholders, as those banks deemed ‘too big to fail’ enjoy advantageous regulatory treatments, such as 
government bailout, to prevent extreme downside risk. It remains an empirical question whether the 
heavy regulation in banking can re-shape the merger–pay links documented in non-financial industries. 
Second, bank CEO pay is based on less equity than CEO pay in non-financial industries (Adams and 
Mehran, 2003); and bank CEO pay–risk sensitivity is significantly lower than that of industrial firms, 
despite efforts by banks since the mid-1990s to increase it (Belkhir and Chazi, 2010;  DeYoung et al., 
2013). The disparity in their pay structure calls for careful explanations of the differences in M&A 
engagement between bank CEOs and non-financial firm CEOs. Third, corporate governance practices 
of banks are not identical to those of industrial firms (Adams and Mehran, 2003). It is meaningful to 
study whether CEO compensation, as a major internal governance mechanism, functions differently in 
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linking to M&A decisions across the two groups of firms. Fourth, compared to shareholders of industrial 
firms, bank shareholders are likely to take excessive risks at the expense of debt holders (John et al., 
2010). One such activity is M&As, which are economically significant and highly risky in nature. Banks 
are debt holders of industrial firms and have the incentives to monitor the latter using their expertise 
and information advantage. In contrast, bank depositors do not have the incentives to monitor bank 
managers, as their deposits are largely insured. Given the risk nature of M&As and the different 
monitoring roles of debt holders, it is worthwhile to study whether M&As are associated with CEO 
compensation differently across banks and industrial firms.  
We decompose asset growth in banks into growth driven by bank mergers and internal growth 
unrelated to mergers. We examine the changes in CEO compensation in response to the two different 
means of bank growth. Several key findings emerge. First, we document a positive relation between 
CEO total compensation and asset growth through bank mergers. Among the components of the total 
compensation, merger growth significantly increases the level of equity compensation but does not 
significantly affect the level of cash compensation. Second, CEO compensation is positively related to 
non-merger internal growth. However, it adds much less to CEO compensation than does the same 
dollar amount of merger growth. Acquiring $1 million of new assets through mergers increases CEO 
total compensation by $187.5; by comparison, $1 million of non-merger internal growth increases the 
total compensation by only $13. Finally, while CEO pay–risk sensitivity (vega) is not significantly 
related to merger growth, we find that CEO pay–performance sensitivity (delta) is negatively and 
significantly related to merger growth, which suggests that, through M&As, CEOs wield their increased 
power to decouple their equity wealth from bank performance.  
We address endogeneity problems in three ways. First, we include firm-fixed effects to control 
for time-invariant firm heterogeneity that may drive the merger–pay relation. Second, as we find the 
current level of CEO compensation is associated with its past levels, we use a dynamic panel system 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995) to mitigate reverse 
causality and time-invariant omitted variable bias. Third, we adopt a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
estimator combined with propensity score matching (PSM) to further alleviate the endogeneity concerns. 
The DiD estimator compares the variations in CEO compensation around M&As between acquiring 
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banks and matched non-acquiring control banks, which removes the effect of constant firm-level 
heterogeneity and unobserved common time trends. Matches between acquiring and non-acquiring 
control banks are identified by using PSM, which reduces the selection bias due to observed factors that 
drive bank mergers. The empirical results reaffirm our main findings. 
We split the sample banks into high versus low groups based on the median dollar value of bank 
merger activity over the sample period. We find that CEOs of high-merger banks are paid less per dollar 
value of assets acquired through M&As than CEOs of low-merger banks. The result suggests that high-
merger banks discourage CEOs’ excessive merger activity through compensation arrangements. In 
addition, we find that merger growth significantly increases CEO vega of low-merger banks but does 
not significantly affect the vega of high-merger banks. This indicates that low-merger banks respond to 
their below-median M&A intensity by conferring more incentives on CEOs to employ risky investment 
opportunities. 
We extend our analysis to the compensation arrangements of ‘top five’ executives in banks. We 
find that asset growth through bank mergers increases their total compensation. More specifically, it 
increases the level of equity component but does not affect the level of cash component, which is 
consistent with our findings for bank CEOs. Nonetheless, we do not find that top five executives’ delta 
or vega shifts around bank mergers.  
We compare the impact of M&As on CEO compensation in industrial firms with that in banks. 
Industrial firms operate in different business and regulatory environments. Their merger impact on 
compensation structure as well as the incentives derived may be different. We show that mergers in 
industrial firms substantially increase CEO cash compensation, a result absent in bank mergers. One 
possible explanation is that industrial firms are regulated to a lesser extent, making the large cash 
payments more feasible. Although CEOs in industrial firms gain higher total and equity compensation 
after M&As, their compensation increases due to mergers are smaller than those in banks. In industrial 
firms, both CEO delta and vega increase following M&As, indicating that the post-merger 
compensation arrangements better align CEO incentives with shareholder interests and motivate CEOs 
to take higher risks. The results taken together highlight a less severe agency problem in CEO 
compensation as a consequence of industrial firm mergers compared to bank mergers. In line with this 
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argument, our DiD analysis shows that, relative to matched mergers in industrial firms, bank mergers 
significantly increase CEO total and equity compensation but decrease CEO delta. 
During the global financial crisis (GFC), banks experienced dramatic financial losses. Despite a 
positive merger–pay relation existent in most of our sample period, bank mergers significantly reduced 
CEO compensation during the breakout of the GFC. The dramatic losses suffered by banks, and the 
resulting illiquidity that plagued the real economy, demanded that policymakers take a closer look at 
the roots of the crisis. One common view is that the crisis is at least partly the result of exorbitant risk 
taking by banks (Bhagat and Bolton, 2014), which warrants regulative changes in the banking sector to 
incentivise bank managers properly through compensation design. Notwithstanding the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 that created new rules to restrict managerial 
compensation in financial institutions, we document a positive effect of merger growth on CEO 
compensation and vega in the post-crisis period. This finding suggests that investing in M&As is one 
way for bank CEOs to counter the regulatory intention of curbing excessive executive pay and risk 
taking. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following respects. First, we clarify the 
impact of bank mergers on various aspects of CEO compensation, complementing the literature in the 
banking industry, such as Anderson et al. (2004) and Bliss and Rosen (2001). Specifically, we analyse 
the merger’s effect on CEO compensation along all its three dimensions (overall level, composition and 
incentives), among which our most novel work lies in the analysis of CEO incentives embedded in post-
merger compensation packages – namely, the merger-related shifts in delta and vega. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to undertake such a comprehensive assessment of the merger–pay relation 
in banks. 
Our results are generally consistent with Bliss and Rosen (2001), who focus on the level of 
compensation and show that CEO compensation increases after bank mergers. We substantially extend 
their study by examining how bank mergers shape CEO incentives. More importantly, it is unclear in 
Bliss and Rosen (2001) whether the increased CEO compensation subsequent to bank mergers is a result 
of optimal contracting that rewards talented CEOs who select profitable M&A opportunities, or is 
driven by rent extraction motives of self-serving CEOs in anticipation of better remuneration following 
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M&As. Our evidence is supportive of the latter view and suggestive of the rent extraction purposes of 
acquiring CEOs, for two reasons: (1) bank mergers in our sample, on average, are associated with 
negative abnormal announcement stock returns and, thus, it is unlikely that the higher compensation 
after mergers represents managerial talent for seeking out value-increasing M&A investments; and (2) 
acquiring CEOs are found to decouple their firm-specific equity wealth from the post-merger stock 
returns, indicative of post-merger CEO incentives being beneficial to CEOs themselves but sub-optimal 
for shareholders. 
Our study is the first to compare the merger–pay relation between banks and industrial firms by 
using a DiD estimator.1 The significantly higher CEO compensation and lower CEO delta after bank 
mergers relative to matched mergers in industrial firms reflect a more severe agency problem in bank 
mergers. In addition, the previous studies for industrial firms, such as Grinstein and Hribar (2004), 
Harford and Li (2007), and Yim (2013), only examine the variation in the level of CEO compensation 
around M&As and do not compare the change in CEO compensation due to merger growth with that 
due to non-merger internal growth. Our results based on a sample of industrial firms show that merger 
growth has a larger increasing effect on CEO compensation than non-merger internal growth, which 
highlights the efficacy of M&As used as a device for industrial firm CEOs to raise their pay. 
Second, a large literature has shown that firm size is a major driver of CEO compensation – larger 
firms pay their CEOs more (Baker et al., 1988; Conyon, 2014; Murphy, 1985; Murphy, 1999). However, 
the positive relation between firm size and CEO compensation does not necessarily imply that M&As, 
among many ways to grow firms (e.g., internal sales growth, capital expenditures, and investment in 
research and development), benefit CEO compensation, as the majority of M&As are value destroying 
for shareholders (e.g., Agrawal et al., 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Moeller et al., 2005; Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998), which may not be rewarded by boards of directors of acquiring firms (see, e.g., 
Lambert and Larcker, 1988). The existing literature provides mixed evidence on this relation for 
industrial firms. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and Harford and Li (2007) find that M&As have a positive 
                                                          
 
1 We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting the DiD approach for comparing bank mergers with mergers in 
industrial firms. 
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effect on subsequent CEO pay, while Avery et al. (1998) do not find this effect. In the banking industry, 
the relation is also obscure. Bliss and Rosen (2001) find that CEOs in banks receive higher 
compensation after mergers. However, Anderson et al. (2004) find no such effect. Our paper helps 
clarify the unsettled merger–pay relation for bank CEOs. In particular, we advance the previous studies 
by differentiating the effects of bank expansion attained in two different ways – namely, M&As and 
internal asset growth. We show that per-dollar amount of merger growth adds significantly more to 
CEO compensation than does the same dollar amount of non-merger internal growth.  
Finally, our paper supplements the growing literature on executive compensation and the GFC. 
Bhagat and Bolton (2014) argue that the GFC can be attributed, at least in part, to the sub-optimal design 
of executive compensation, which motivates bank CEOs to take excessive risks. This necessitates 
regulative changes in the banking sector to incentivise CEOs properly through the arrangements of 
compensation. However, contradictory to the policy intention, our study finds evidence suggesting that 
the post-crisis regulatory changes in U.S. financial institutions play a rather limited role in curbing the 
merger–pay links. Expanding bank size via M&As is one way for CEOs to increase their pay post-crisis. 
After the crisis, bank mergers led to CEO compensation structures with higher vega, which indicates 
that government intervention fails to discourage acquiring banks from providing their CEOs with risk-
taking incentives to take advantage of post-crisis new growth opportunities.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides literature and develops 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research methodology and sample. Section 4 presents our main 
results. Section 5 conducts additional analyses. Section 6 concludes this paper. 
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
(i) Executive Compensation 
Research on executive compensation is based upon two predominant theoretical approaches. One is 
optimal contracting, which posits that executive compensation serves as a device to alleviate the conflict 
of interests between stakeholders. For example, shareholders may structure executive compensation to 
encourage managers to maximise firm value. As predicted by this approach, there exist optimal 
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compensation contracts that are devised by boards of directors to minimise agency costs and to align 
managerial incentives with the interests of shareholders. However, the evidence is mixed regarding 
whether executive compensation has been properly designed to attain the incentive alignment aim. On 
the one hand, Murphy (1985) documents a positive relation between executive compensation and stock 
price, which suggests that the compensation rewards managerial efforts in increasing firm value. Hall 
and Liebman (1998) show that CEO compensation is responsive to stock price and that the 
responsiveness has risen sharply in the 1990s due primarily to a large increase in stock option grants. 
On the other hand, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Murphy (1999) 
find that CEO compensation is only weakly linked to firm performance, making compensation 
underpowered as a tool to motivate CEOs to perform. 
The other theoretical approach is the managerial power hypothesis, proposed by Bebchuk et al. 
(2002), who conceive executive compensation as part of agency problems. In this framework, powerful 
managers exert influence over boards of directors to structure their own compensation for their personal 
benefit at the expense of shareholders. In firms with diffused ownership, managers may behave 
opportunistically. They may capture boards (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999) or hire compensation 
consultants who cater to their own interests (Murphy and Sandino, 2010). Under these circumstances, 
managers can use their substantial power to extract rents from the firms they manage. In particular, they 
can earn excess pay beyond the efficient level predicted by optimal contracting. In direct support, Morse 
et al. (2011) document a strong link between CEO power and higher pay. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) 
find that these powerful managers not only seek higher pay but detach their pay from the performance 
of their firms so that they can be overly compensated even when firms underperform. In addition, Lord 
and Saito (2012) find that CEOs can structure their compensation to reduce personal risk. 
In fact, the two approaches – optimal contracting and managerial power – are not mutually 
exclusive, as neither offers a fully convincing explanation for the extant evidence. As Bebchuk et al. 
(2002) state, ‘compensation arrangements are shaped both by managerial power and by what would be 
optimal’ (p. 3). 
Different forms of compensation provide managerial incentives to different degrees. A standard 
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managerial compensation package consists of base salary, bonus, stock grants, option grants, long-term 
incentive payments, and other compensation such as perquisites and life insurance premiums. Much 
research has focused on its cash (salary and bonus) and equity (stock and options) components for 
improving the efficiency of incentive rewards. Baker et al. (1988) and Mehran (1995) both suggest that, 
in lieu of cash compensation that attaches CEO pay to past firm performance, equity compensation 
entails most of the incentives that are crucial in maximising shareholder value because CEOs are 
generally not allowed to trade or exercise newly granted equities in a predetermined vesting period 
(typically, five years), which creates long-term incentives for CEOs to benefit shareholder value. 
Consequently, stock and options have been increasingly used in executive compensation awards. This 
equity component has been seen as essential to linking CEO pay to firm performance and thereby 
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders.2 
Estimating the value of CEO equity holdings, as well as its sensitivities to stock price and stock 
return volatility, is a principal goal of Core and Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002). The pay–
performance sensitivity (delta) quantifies CEOs’ incentives to increase firm value by estimating the 
sensitivity of CEO equity wealth to stock returns. Although higher delta motivates CEOs to make more 
value-enhancing investments, CEOs with high delta may deliberately forgo positive net present value 
(NPV) investments that carry high risks. Guay (1999) finds that the convex payoffs from option-based 
compensation can counter this effect, as CEOs share the gains of option holdings when stock price rises 
but do not suffer all the losses when stock price falls. The incentives related to the convexity of 
compensation are measured by the sensitivity of CEO option wealth to stock return volatility (vega).3  
Effective corporate governance can curb CEO rent extraction in compensation. Bertrand and 
                                                          
 
2 However, it should be noted that the extensive use of equity compensation may engender undesirable outcomes. 
For example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that managers with higher equity compensation are more likely to 
manipulate reported earnings. 
3 Delta provides CEOs with an ambiguous incentive to take risks. On the one hand, as delta ties CEO equity wealth 
to stock price, it prompts CEOs to take on risky projects that are expected to increase shareholder value 
(Armstrong et al., 2015). On the other hand, as delta exposes CEOs to higher risks, it may discourage risk-averse 
CEOs from making risky investments (Coles et al., 2006). In contrast, there is clear evidence that high vega is 
associated with firm risk taking activities, including investment in research and development (Coles et al., 2006), 
aggressive debt policy (Gormley et al., 2013), earnings management (Armstrong et al., 2013), tax avoidance 
(Armstrong et al., 2015) and high equity cost (Chen et al., 2015). 
10 
 
Mullainathan (2001) find that CEOs are paid less for luck in better-governed firms, such as firms with 
large shareholders sitting on boards. Hartzell and Starks (2003) show that higher institutional ownership 
concentration reduces managerial compensation and increases managerial pay–performance sensitivity, 
suggesting that institutional investors play a monitoring role in the pay-setting process. Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2009) document a decrease in CEO pay once board oversight is strengthened. Hsu and 
Liao (2012) show that auditors’ detection of firms’ internal control problems materially reduces 
executive compensation. 
Executive compensation is also a focus of research in the banking industry. A majority of the 
literature examines the pay–performance relation. Barro and Barro (1990) find that bank CEO 
compensation is sensitive to bank performance. The sensitivity is associated with CEO experience 
(Barro and Barro, 1990), managerial discretion (Magnan and St-Onge, 1997), board independence 
(Mishra and Nielsen, 2000), and outside monitoring by non-depository debt holders and regulators 
(John et al., 2010). Hubbard and Palia (1995) show that the permission of interstate banking 
significantly increases CEO pay and pay–performance sensitivity. Related, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009) 
show that bank CEO compensation becomes more equity-based and more sensitive to bank performance 
following two major banking deregulations.4  In contrast to the above studies, which document a 
significant pay–performance link, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that bank CEOs with greater 
compensation incentives to raise bank value did not perform better during the financial crisis. 
Another line of research studies the relation between compensation and bank risk taking. Belkhir 
and Chazi (2010) and DeYoung et al. (2013) find that banks in which CEOs have higher pay–risk 
sensitivity tend to take higher risks. Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) show that high pay–risk 
sensitivity motivates bank CEOs to undertake M&As that increase the default risk of banks. Bebchuk 
and Spamann (2010) argue that equity awards generate excessive risk-taking incentives for bank CEOs 
and that this problem cannot be eliminated through corporate governance reforms. Thanassoulis (2014) 
suggests that a compensation cap in proportion to bank assets can be set to reduce bank risk but increase 
                                                          
 
4 The two deregulations are the removal of interstate banking restrictions, and the consolidation of commercial 
banking, investment banking and insurance services. 
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bank value. 
(ii) Merger Activity and Executive Compensation 
Acquirer shareholders, on average, do not profit from M&As. The stock market responds negatively to 
most M&A announcements (e.g., Agrawal et al., 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Moeller et al., 2005; 
Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). The aggressive expansion of firm size comes at the expense of shareholder 
value and could be viewed as attempts of acquirer managers to seek personal benefit.5 Drawing on the 
fact that managers in larger firms are generally paid more (Baker et al., 1988; Conyon, 2014; Murphy, 
1985; Murphy, 1999), several studies have explored how executive compensation changes following 
M&As, resulting in two major views.  
The first view contends that managers raise their compensation and wealth by pursuing M&As 
that substantially enlarge firms. Conyon and Gregg (1994) analyse the merger–pay relation in U.K. 
firms, showing that firm expansion through M&As significantly elevates CEO compensation, which in 
turn, however, does not increase shareholder returns. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) show that, in U.S. 
firms, CEOs with more power over boards tend to enter larger M&A deals and receive higher bonuses, 
which is shown to cause the acquirer’s stock price to decline. Harford and Li (2007) find that CEOs 
have an incentive to undertake M&As, as they will be rewarded with a considerable amount of equity 
compensation, which increases their subsequent wealth even when the stock market reacts negatively 
to the M&As. Bugeja et al. (2012a) find that acquiring CEOs in Australian firms receive higher 
compensation in all the components of their compensation packages. Yim (2013) reveals that M&As 
give rise to large permanent growth in CEO pay, which encourages CEOs to make M&As early in their 
careers.  
                                                          
 
5 CEO pay is positively related to firm size (e.g., Baker et al., 1988; Conyon, 2014; Murphy, 1985; Murphy, 1999). 
This is not surprising because larger firms, in which managerial tasks are more complex, demand more skilled 
CEOs to manage them. The CEOs, therefore, receive higher pay. Nonetheless, the pay–size relation cannot be 
fully justified by managerial skills. Murphy (1985) finds that the positive pay–size relation holds irrespective of 
stock price changes, which suggests that CEOs obtain higher pay simply by expanding firm size even when the 
expansion destroys shareholder value. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) document that CEOs are paid more when 
they expand firm size but are not paid less when firm size decreases. Furthermore, there is evidence that CEO pay 
in larger firms is less sensitive to stock price (e.g., Baker and Hall, 2004; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 
1999; Schaefer, 1998). Overall, the results are consistent with the notion in Hope and Thomas (2008) and Jensen 
(1986) that CEOs realise self-serving gains at the expense of shareholders through empire building. 
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The alternative view is that managers undertake M&As to boost their power and prestige from 
running a larger, more complex firm after the consolidation, which does not necessarily lead to larger 
compensation or greater wealth. This argument is supported by Lambert and Larcker (1988), who find 
that the value-reducing M&As that most firms engage in do not lead to wealth increase as the large 
post-merger decrease in the value of equity holdings outweighs the small increase in cash compensation. 
Similarly, Khorana and Zenner (1998) show that the positive impact of M&As on executive 
compensation is rather small and that M&As that reduce shareholder value do not increase executive 
compensation. A related study by Avery et al. (1998) documents that CEOs who invest in M&As do 
not experience larger compensation growth than CEOs who make no M&A investments, whether or 
not the M&As are profitable for shareholders. These authors further argue that undertaking M&As 
benefits CEOs because managing larger firms improves CEO prestige and status within the business 
community. 
The arrangements of executive compensation also have an impact on corporate M&A decisions. 
Cai and Vijh (2007) find that CEOs who hold more equities are more likely to make M&As and tend 
to buy undervalued targets using more stock-based payments. Seo et al. (2015) find that CEOs who are 
underpaid relative to their peers are more likely to engage in M&As to raise their own compensation. 
Williams and Rao (2006) show that CEO pay–risk sensitivity is positively associated with equity return 
volatility subsequent to M&As. Croci and Petmezas (2015) find that CEOs with higher pay–risk 
sensitivity are more likely to undertake M&As. 
The empirical work on the merger–pay relation in banks is relatively scarce. The study by Bliss 
and Rosen (2001) reports a significant increase in post-merger compensation for CEOs in banks, and 
the increase in compensation is found to arise primarily from large cash rewards to CEOs. Their study 
also shows that bank CEOs with higher levels of equity compensation are less likely to engage in M&As, 
as CEO equity wealth would diminish due to the typical negative stock market reactions to M&As. 
Anderson et al. (2004) find that the post-merger changes in CEO pay are positively associated with the 
combined returns to acquirer and target shareholders around merger announcements. Minnick et al. 
(2011) show that banks whose CEOs have higher pay–performance sensitivity are more likely to make 
value-increasing acquisitions and experience larger performance enhancements following acquisitions.  
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(iii) Hypotheses Development 
We develop our hypotheses along the three dimensions of CEO compensation – the level, composition 
and functional form. The first dimension (level) is the total value of a CEO’s compensation package. 
The second dimension (composition) is the dollar value of each compensation component, including 
equities, cash and many others (e.g., perquisites, insurance and long-term incentive payments). The 
third dimension (functional form) describes the incentive structure of the compensation package. Two 
relevant measures are delta and vega. Since our study aims to clarify whether bank CEOs earn self-
serving compensation contracts through M&As, we formulate our hypotheses based on the managerial 
power approach in which executive compensation is viewed as part of agency problems and is employed 
by powerful managers to enhance their own benefits. 
Murphy (1985) shows that CEO compensation increases with firm size regardless of whether the 
size expansion leads to value creation. That is, CEOs can be better remunerated simply by enlarging 
firms, even when the aggressive expansion diminishes shareholder value. A common way in which firm 
size can be rapidly increased is M&As, which are frequently followed by substantial declines in stock 
price. Although firms often refer to synergy gains to justify their merger decisions, some unobservable 
empire-building aspects, such as CEOs’ desire for status, power and new fields of business, also 
motivate these firm-expansion decisions (e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981; Black, 1989; Ravenscraft and 
Scherer, 2011; Trautwein, 1990). Acquiring CEOs typically obtain greater decision-making power from 
managing a larger, consolidated enterprise. According to the managerial power hypothesis (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2002), we expect that these acquiring CEOs exercise their increased 
power to capture the pay-setting process so as to earn higher levels of pay from the consolidated banks. 
Formally, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 1: Asset growth through bank mergers increases CEO total compensation. 
In principle, firms can utilise cash bonuses to fully remunerate managers for their efforts in 
improving firm performance. However, in practice, firms do not heavily use cash bonuses as incentive 
pay. As discussed in Baker et al. (1988), large monetary rewards can lead managers to focus narrowly 
on achieving tasks and constrain intrinsic interests that managers may pursue through efforts, which 
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together destroy managers’ motivation to perform. Boards of directors thus often refrain from paying 
large cash amounts to managers (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). It would be difficult for CEOs to make 
their compensation more cash-based than equity-based. In addition, the huge disparity in the levels of 
monetary rewards between CEOs and employees constitutes severe compensation disparity within the 
firms, which may diminish employees’ enthusiasm about enhancing firm productivity (Baker et al., 
1988). Moreover, since equity compensation, which is closely linked to firm performance, appears to 
align the best interests of CEOs and shareholders, largely increasing equity pay rather than cash pay is 
relatively more justifiable in the highly regulated banking industry, especially when most acquirers 
perform poorly after M&As. Therefore, it is likely that the increase in total compensation due to mergers 
arises from large equity grants rather than cash rewards. We expect that acquiring CEOs receive higher 
levels of equity compensation after mergers and that the increase in cash compensation is negligible. 
Formally, we hypothesise:  
Hypothesis 2a: Asset growth through bank mergers increases CEO equity compensation. 
Hypothesis 2b: Asset growth through bank mergers does not affect CEO cash compensation. 
Next, we investigate how CEO delta shifts after bank mergers. According to the managerial power 
hypothesis, managers tend to capture the pay-setting process to obtain favourable compensation 
contracts. The rapid bank growth via M&As expands CEOs’ decision-making power to seek such rents. 
The increased power subsequent to M&As could allow CEOs to detach their equity wealth from bank 
performance. Given the large evidence showing that acquirers experience remarkable stock price 
declines during the few years following merger completion (Agrawal et al., 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 
1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), acquiring CEOs have strong incentives to disconnect their equity 
wealth from the underperformed stock price in order to reduce their losses incurred. Therefore, we 
expect a decrease in CEO delta following bank mergers. Formally, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 3: Asset growth through bank mergers decreases CEO delta. 
The effect of bank mergers on CEO vega is less clear. On the one hand, CEO vega may decrease 
after bank mergers. Generally, CEOs, like many other top managers, are risk-averse (Mehran, 1995). 
To the extent that risk-averse CEOs may forgo some risky investments that are value-enhancing for 
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shareholders (Smith and Stulz, 1985), acquiring CEOs may seek rents that reduce the sensitivity of their 
equity wealth to bank risk (i.e., lower vega), so that they will be less constrained in their risk-avoiding 
behaviour. On the other hand, CEO vega may increase after bank mergers. Guay (1999) suggests that 
CEO vega is shaped by firms’ investment opportunity set. In his view, the costs of abandoning risky 
but positive NPV projects are particularly high in firms with abundant investment opportunities, such 
as M&A investments. To reduce the risk-related agency costs, boards of directors may elect to give 
CEOs greater incentives to undertake these risky investments (i.e., higher vega). As can be seen, the net 
effect of bank mergers on CEO vega is a result of the CEO risk-aversion effect weighed against the 
shareholder wealth effect. We thus present our hypothesis in null form:  
Hypothesis 4: Asset growth through bank mergers does not affect CEO vega. 
3. MODEL AND DATA 
(i) Research Design 
We examine the impact of bank growth through mergers on CEO pay and pay sensitivity using the 
following regression models: 
CEO pay𝑖,𝑡           
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼3 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼4 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛼5 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼9 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
 
CEO pay sensitivity𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽5 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (2) 
where i indexes firm, and t indexes year. In equation (1), CEO pay is measured by three different 
variables: (1) total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, value of stock grants, Black-Scholes value 
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of stock option grants, other annual compensation (e.g., perquisites and other personal benefits), long-
term incentive payments and all other compensation (e.g., debt forgiveness and life insurance 
premiums); (2) equity compensation is the value of stock and stock option grants; and (3) cash 
compensation is salary plus bonus. A large body of early literature, such as Bliss and Rosen (2001) and 
Datta et al. (2001), exploits equity compensation as a proxy for the incentives embedded in CEO 
compensation. However, this approach only accounts for the stock and options newly granted to CEOs 
and excludes the incentives derived from the dollar change in CEOs’ existing equity holdings. With this 
caveat in mind, we follow Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006) to calculate CEO pay sensitivity, 
which captures CEOs’ incentives arising from their newly granted and previously held equities. In 
equation (2), CEO pay sensitivity is measured by (1) the pay–performance sensitivity (delta), calculated 
as the dollar change in the value of CEO stock and stock option portfolio given a 1% change in the 
stock price; and (2) the pay–risk sensitivity (vega), calculated as the dollar change in the value of CEO 
stock option portfolio given a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of stock returns.6 CEOs with higher 
delta have stronger incentives to improve stock price performance, while CEOs with higher vega have 
stronger incentives to take risks. 
We identify a sample of megamergers whose transaction value exceeds 10% of the acquirer’s 
market capitalisation measured 20 trading days prior to the merger announcement date. Since they are 
economically significant capital events and are very likely to affect CEO compensation arrangements, 
we focus our analyses on these megamergers. To ensure robustness, and also to gain some insight into 
bank merger strategy, we additionally test our hypotheses using the sample of all mergers, disregarding 
the deal size.  
It may take time for M&As to exert an impact on CEO compensation arrangements.7 As such, we 
examine how asset growth through bank mergers completed over the prior three years affects CEO pay 
                                                          
 
6 Guay (1999) shows that the sensitivity of CEO equity portfolio (including both stock and stock options) to stock 
return volatility is driven primarily by stock options. Consistent with the convention in the literature (e.g., 
Armstrong et al., 2013; Core and Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 2006), we assume stock vega equal to 0 and use option 
vega as a proxy for the vega of CEO equity portfolio. 
7 CEO compensation contracts typically last five years (Murphy, 1999). 
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and pay sensitivity of the current year. To differentiate between asset growth through bank mergers and 
non-merger internal growth, we construct the following explanatory variables. Total assets at t ̶3 is the 
book value of total assets at the end of year t ̶3. Assets acquired in megamergers is the value of total 
assets acquired via megamergers from the end of year t 3̶ to the end of year t. Non-megamerger growth 
is non-megamerger internal asset growth over the prior three years, calculated as the book value of total 
assets at the end of year t minus Total assets at t 3̶ and Assets acquired in megamergers. For all merger 
activities, Assets acquired in all mergers is the value of total assets acquired via all mergers over the 
previous three years, and Non-merger growth is non-merger internal asset growth over the same three-
year period. As some targets are private firms and their financial data are not easily accessible, we use 
deal size to measure the value of assets acquired. 
Since CEOs in better-performing firms are generally paid more (Core et al., 1999; Murphy, 1999), 
our models control for the performance of banks. Specifically, to capture bank performance in stock 
markets, two variables are created to distinguish between the change in stock price related to industry-
wide fluctuations and that related to idiosyncratic stock price movements: (1) Change in firm value due 
to change in industry index is the dollar change in the bank’s equity value from the end of year t 3̶ to 
the end of year t, given the percentage change equal to the value-weighted banking industry index return; 
and (2) Change in firm value due to idiosyncratic change is the dollar change in the bank’s equity value 
due to firm-specific stock price movements, which is calculated as the total dollar change in the bank’s 
equity value over the prior three years minus Change in firm value due to change in industry index. 
Return on assets is included to measure the accounting performance of banks. Due to the significant 
effects of executive characteristics on compensation arrangements (Bugeja et al., 2012b; Cyert et al., 
2002), our models also control for a variety of CEO characteristics, such as CEO gender (Female CEO) 
and age (CEO age). Additionally, CEO duality is incorporated as a measure of CEO power, and is set 
equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. CEO shareholding is the shares 
held by the CEO as a percentage of the bank’s total shares outstanding. All the variables are defined in 
the appendix. Year dummies are included to capture macroeconomic, regulatory and aggregate shifts 
in CEO pay and pay sensitivity across years. The models are then estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions with robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering.  
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(ii) Sample Construction 
Our sample comprises all publicly listed bank holding companies (SIC code 6000–6099) in the United 
States. We obtain their domestic M&A data from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. We 
include an M&A transaction in our analyses if it satisfies the following criteria: (1) the transaction is 
completed; (2) the transaction value exceeds $1 million; and (3) the acquirer owns more than 50% of 
the target’s shares after the transaction, where the target can be a private firm and not necessarily a bank. 
The M&A data are then matched with executive compensation data from Execucomp, firm-level 
accounting data from Compustat and stock market data from CRSP. These procedures yield a sample 
of 1,753 bank-years from 184 banks for the period 1992–2014.8 
(iii) Distribution of Bank Mergers 
Table 1 reports bank merger distribution and deal characteristics by merger completion year. In past 
waves of banking consolidation, the number of megamergers (mergers) made by banks rises from 2 (11) 
in 1992 to the peak of 34 (117) in 1998. The peak period roughly coincided with the enactment of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, which allowed commercial banks 
to acquire other financial service providers. This trend of merger activity in banks is very similar to that 
documented by Masulis et al. (2007) and Moeller et al. (2004) in industrial firms. Over the years since 
2000, banking consolidation intensity has gradually weakened, despite 2004 being the height of the 
recent wave. Over the entire sample period, megamergers account for about 78% of the transaction 
value of all mergers. The megamergers, on average, make up 31.62% of the pre-megamerger market 
capitalisation of acquiring banks. The stock market generally responds negatively to M&A 
announcements made by acquiring banks,9 which is consistent with the findings of Anderson et al. 
(2004) and Grinstein and Hribar (2004). The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from day –2 to day +2 
(in trading days) around an average megamerger (merger) announcement is –1.71% (–0.78%), where 
                                                          
 
8 Execucomp compensation data is available from 1992. 
9 In Panel A of Table 1, the average CAR[–2,+2] and [–2,+250] in 2009 are 41.70% and 109.12%, respectively. 
The large positive stock return is due to the large cash dividends paid by acquiring banks on the megamerger 
announcement day. 
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day 0 is the megamerger (merger) announcement date.10 The mean CAR from day –2 to day +250 is –
3.41% in the megamerger sample and –7.51% in the all-merger sample, suggestive of a long-run post-
merger stock price underperformance of acquiring banks. 
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
(iv) Sample Characteristics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for CEOs in banks. In Panel A, a bank CEO’s total compensation 
ranges from $0.38 to $23.26 million. In banks, 52.4% of CEO total compensation is paid out in the form 
of stock and options, with an average equity compensation of $2.12 million, while 31.5% is in the form 
of cash, with an average cash compensation of $1.27 million. On average, a positive stock return of 1% 
brings about an increase of $507,000 in the value of CEO stock and stock option portfolio, while a 0.01 
increase in the standard deviation of stock returns corresponds to an increase of $126,000 in the value 
of CEO stock option portfolio. Mergers are infrequent capital events. The change in bank size is due 
primarily to internal asset growth, with the average dollar amount of non-megamerger internal growth 
equal to $16.68 billion and the average dollar amount of assets acquired in megamergers over the past 
three years equal to $1.03 billion. In addition, only 2.5% of bank CEOs are female. About 63.7% of 
CEOs serve as board chairs. The CEOs on average hold 1.2% of the shares outstanding in their banks. 
The variation in bank equity value over the prior three years is driven mainly by industry-wide stock 
return movements rather than by idiosyncratic stock price changes. The sample banks report an average 
return on assets of 2.5%. More than half of bank shares are held by institutional investors, with an 
average percentage of institutional stock holdings of 55.7%. The average bank board consists of nearly 
13 directors, among whom 74.5% are independent directors. Panel B reports average CEO pay and pay 
sensitivity across sample years. There was an upward trend in CEO total compensation before 2000, 
which thereafter declined slightly. The rapid increase in CEO pay generally coincided with bank merger 
waves.  
                                                          
 
10 The expected return used to compute the CAR comes from a market model with the CRSP value-weighted 
index return as the market return over an estimation window [–250,–20] prior to the announcement date. 
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<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
4. MAIN RESULTS 
(i) Determinants of Bank Merger Announcements 
Identifying the causal effect of merger growth on CEO compensation is challenging. CEOs who 
anticipate that M&A announcements will adversely affect their personal equity wealth may structure 
their compensation or equity holdings in advance of the announcements. The incentives embedded in 
their compensation may also impact on their M&A decisions. These possibilities would lead to a reverse 
causation from CEO compensation to bank M&As. Thus, it is important to assess whether CEO 
compensation can influence the decision of banks to undertake M&As. Our exploration is based on an 
analysis of the likelihood of megamerger announcements as a function of CEO pay and pay sensitivity. 
The regressions are estimated using a probit model in which the dependent variable takes the value of 
1 if at least one megamerger announcement is made by a bank in a given year, and 0 otherwise.11 The 
right-hand side of the model incorporates the compensation measures of major interests, as well as 
control variables that have been shown to influence corporate M&A decisions (Byrd and Hickman, 
1992; Levi et al., 2010; Shivdasani, 1993), including Return on assets, Market-to-book, Leverage, Sales 
growth, Cash holdings, Ln(Total assets), Institutional ownership, Institutional ownership concentration, 
Board independence, Board size, Female CEO, CEO duality, CEO age and CEO shareholding. The 
independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. 
In Panel A of Table 3, we present regression results on the determinants of bank megamerger 
announcements. In column 1, we find that the level of CEO total compensation is positively associated 
with the likelihood of megamerger announcements. For the different components of the total 
compensation, we observe in column 2 that the level of equity compensation significantly increases 
megamerger propensity, while the level of cash compensation is statistically insignificant in predicting 
the propensity. The increasing effect of CEO total compensation on megamerger announcements is, 
                                                          
 
11 The results based on all-merger announcements are qualitatively unchanged.  
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thus, due primarily to the effect of its equity component. Our results suggest that higher levels of equity 
compensation incentivise CEOs to undertake megamergers. In column 3, we find that CEO delta has 
no significant impact on bank megamerger announcements. CEO vega is positively and significantly 
related to the announcements, consistent with the finding of Croci and Petmezas (2015) for industrial 
firms. In terms of economic significance, in column 5, a one-unit increase in CEO equity compensation 
increases the odds ratio of megamerger announcements by 4.6%, and a one-unit increase in CEO vega 
increases the odds ratio by 82.9%.12 To reduce the undue effect of time-invariant bank factors (e.g., 
bank culture) on the results, we rerun the regressions using a linear probability model with firm-level 
fixed effects. The relations shown in Panel B of Table 3 remain qualitatively unchanged.  
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
(ii) Impact of Bank Mergers on CEO Compensation 
In Table 4, we present regression results of the impact of merger growth on CEO pay and pay sensitivity. 
In columns 1 ̶ 2 of Panel A, the coefficients on merger growth are positive and significant at the 1% 
level, lending support to our hypothesis that asset growth through bank mergers increases CEO total 
compensation. With respect to the components of the compensation, columns 3–6 show that merger 
growth has a significantly positive impact on CEO equity compensation but no significant impact on 
CEO cash compensation. A one-standard-deviation increase in Assets acquired in megamergers is 
associated with a 26.41% (= (0.1875×5.699)/4.046) increase in the total compensation as reported in 
column 1 and a 45.29% (= (0.1684×5.699)/2.119) increase in the equity compensation as shown in 
column 3. Moreover, we find that CEO compensation is also positively related to non-merger internal 
asset growth. Jointly, the results suggest a positive link between CEO pay and bank growth regardless 
of the ways in which the growth is achieved. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that non-merger internal 
growth adds significantly less to CEO pay than does asset growth via mergers. In column 1 of Panel A, 
                                                          
 
12 We calculate the increase in the likelihood of megamerger announcements due to the change in CEO pay and 
pay sensitivity based on coefficient estimates reported in column 5 of Table 3. For a one-unit increase in equity 
compensation, the increase in the likelihood of megamerger announcements = exp(0.0450) ̶ 1 = 4.6%. For a one-
unit increase in vega, the increase in the likelihood of megamerger announcements = exp(0.6037) ̶ 1 = 82.9%. 
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the coefficient on Assets acquired in megamergers is 0.1875, which is significantly larger in magnitude 
than the coefficient of 0.0135 on Non-megamerger growth. The difference between the coefficients is 
0.1740 with a statistically significant t-statistic of 4.35. The magnitude of the coefficients means that 
$1 million of new assets acquired through megamergers leads to an increment of $187.5 in CEO total 
compensation; by contrast, per $1 million of non-megamerger internal growth, the total compensation 
increases by only $13.5. Thus, compared to non-merger internal growth, investing in M&As is a more 
effective, rapid way for CEOs to increase their pay. 
<<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
In Panel B, we present results of the impact of bank growth on the incentives derived from CEO 
compensation plans. Merger growth is negatively related to CEO delta, which highlights the intensified 
agency problem existent in CEO compensation subsequent to bank mergers. In line with the managerial 
power hypothesis, this relation suggests that CEOs with more decision-making power after M&As tend 
to decouple their wealth from banks’ stock price performance in order to reduce their personal losses 
as most banks perform poorly following M&As. By comparison, non-merger internal growth is 
positively related to CEO delta, indicating that banks that grow internally to become large tend to 
provide proper incentives for CEOs to increase bank value. Overall, the results suggest that non-merger 
growth better aligns the incentives of CEOs with the interests of shareholders, whereas merger growth 
exacerbates the agency problem. While we do not find that merger growth exerts a significant impact 
on CEO vega, non-merger internal growth is shown to increase CEO vega, which corroborates the 
argument of Belkhir and Chazi (2010) that larger firms generally have a larger set of positive NPV 
investment opportunities that may carry excess risks and, thus, grant their CEOs stronger incentives to 
undertake these risky investments. 
For the effects of control variables, we find that better-performing banks reward their CEOs better. 
In particular, industry-wide stock price increases have a larger increasing impact on CEO pay than firm-
specific idiosyncratic stock price increases. CEO pay is positively related to the accounting performance 
of banks, as measured by return on assets. Moreover, female CEOs receive lower cash compensation 
than their male counterparts. CEOs who act as board chairs are better remunerated and have more 
incentives to improve bank performance and to take risks. CEOs with larger equity holdings have lower 
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total and cash compensation but higher pay–performance sensitivity, which indicates that equity grants, 
as a substitute for cash awards, can incentivise bank CEOs to make value-increasing investments.  
(iii) Endogeneity 
There are two primary sources of endogeneity that could confound our results. One is reverse causality; 
that is, CEO pay or pay sensitivity may affect bank decisions to acquire other firms. The results in Table 
3 suggest that our findings are plagued with this issue. The other endogeneity threat is from the possible 
existence of unobserved factors that correlate with CEO compensation or incentives and also determine 
bank merger decisions. To alleviate these endogeneity concerns, we employ three different approaches. 
(a) Firm-Fixed Effects Regressions 
In Table 5, we rerun the baseline OLS regressions with additional controls for firm-level fixed effects. 
This helps to rule out the concern that some omitted time-invariant firm-level heterogeneity may drive 
the relation between CEO pay (pay sensitivity) and bank mergers. The fixed effects regression results 
show that asset growth through bank mergers significantly increases the level of total compensation 
and, more specifically, the level of its equity component. In addition, CEO delta declines following 
bank mergers, indicating that CEO firm-related equity wealth is less tied to the bank’s post-merger 
stock price. Notably, the results become relatively less significant after controlling for firm-fixed effects. 
This is because M&As are infrequent capital events, providing little temporal change in merger growth 
variables for fixed effects identification. Overall, the results support our main conclusions. 
<<Insert Table 5 about here>> 
(b) Dynamic OLS Model and Dynamic Panel GMM Estimator 
In Table 3, we have shown that the occurrence of bank merger announcements depends on past levels 
of CEO compensation. The positive impact of merger growth on CEO compensation documented in 
Table 4 could be a result of reverse causality. According to Wintoki et al. (2012), the link between 
current merger decisions and past compensation arrangements should be accounted for by using a 
dynamic model with lagged compensation as a regressor, which can partially control for such reverse 
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causality. In Panel A of Table 6, we incorporate two lags of CEO pay to the right-hand side of the 
baseline regression model.13 This dynamic model is then estimated using OLS regressions. The results 
show that total compensation and equity compensation are positively and significantly related to their 
respective first and second lags, while cash compensation is positively and significantly related only to 
its first lag. The dynamic model complements our baseline static model economically as well as 
statistically. The adjusted R2 in the regression of total compensation rises from 44% in the static model 
in column 1 of Table 4 to 63% in the dynamic model in column 1 of Panel A of Table 6. Most 
importantly, the relations between CEO pay and merger growth remain valid in the dynamic OLS model.  
<<Insert Table 6 about here>> 
However, our results may still suffer from the omitted variable problem. Wintoki et al. (2012) 
argue that in the presence of a dynamic relation, simply employing firm-fixed effects to alleviate this 
endogeneity concern could cause biases, as fixed effects estimation is powerful under an assumption 
that past values of the dependent variable have no impact on current values of any independent variable. 
Wintoki et al. (2012) point out that the dynamic panel system GMM estimator can account for the 
dynamic nature of the model and also control properly for constant unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. 
They stress that the dynamic panel GMM estimator should include enough lags of the dependent 
variable to ensure dynamic completeness – the lags are sufficient to capture all the impact of the past 
on the present. In Panel A of Table 6, we choose the lag length based on whether the lagged dependent 
variable included in the dynamic OLS model is statistically significant. For example, only the first lag 
of cash compensation is included in the dynamic GMM estimation because only the first lag is shown 
in the dynamic OLS regression to be statistically influential. We treat all independent variables in the 
model as endogenous except for year dummies. These endogenous variables are instrumented by two 
of their past values.  
In Panel A of Table 6, we re-examine the merger–pay relation by using the dynamic GMM 
estimator. The results are consistent with our previous findings. We carry out two diagnostic tests to 
                                                          
 
13 The results reported are based only on the megamerger sample. The results for all merger activities (untabulated) 
are qualitatively similar.  
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assess the validity of the dynamic GMM specification. First, we test whether we have included enough 
lags of the dependent variable to make the model dynamically complete. If the lags are sufficient, the 
AR(1) tests should reject the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
residuals, but the AR(2) tests should fail to reject the null of no second-order autocorrelation. It is shown 
that our results pass AR(1) and AR(2) tests. Second, we conduct the Hansen J test of over-identification 
under the null hypothesis that all instruments are exogenous. We fail to reject the null, which indicates 
that all the instruments specified in the dynamic GMM estimator are valid.  
For the impact of merger growth on CEO delta and vega, we apply similar dynamic OLS and 
dynamic panel GMM estimators to the model. Panel B of Table 6 shows that asset growth via 
megamergers significantly reduces CEO delta, but does not significantly affect CEO vega. The dynamic 
GMM diagnostic tests report that the specification is dynamically complete (i.e., pass AR(1) and AR(2) 
tests) and that the instruments are exogenous (i.e., Hansen J statistics are insignificant). The regression 
results corroborate our main conclusions. 
(c) DiD Estimator Combined with Propensity Score Matching 
We use a DiD estimator to compare the change in CEO compensation in acquiring banks before and 
after megamergers to that in matched control banks without megamerger activity during the same time 
period. The DiD estimator helps to address the endogeneity issue in two respects. First, it controls for 
time-invariant firm-level heterogeneity for both treatment and control banks as it is estimating the 
variation in CEO compensation surrounding megamergers within each bank. Second, it compares 
treatment banks to control banks over the same time period and thereby controls for the aggregate 
change in CEO compensation due to unobserved common trends that affect the two groups of banks in 
the same way. In particular, the staggered completion of megamergers made by different banks reduces 
the confounding effects of concurrent non-merger events. 
We carry out the DiD analysis over a five-year event window centred on the megamerger 
completion year – two years before and two years after the megamerger – to ensure that the time is 
sufficient for megamergers to make an impact on CEO compensation. We focus on megamergers 
instead of all mergers for two reasons. First, the all-merger sample consists of a large number of small 
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mergers whose impact on CEO compensation could be rather limited. Second, to identify the effect of 
a single merger on CEO compensation, treatment banks must have no merger activity during the two 
years before and two years after the merger completion year. The all-merger sample spans less 
discretely over the sample period, making such a sample less easily obtainable. In addition, the CEO of 
a treatment bank must not be replaced in the five-year event window, such that the change in CEO 
compensation is not caused by any changes in CEO characteristics due to the replacement. A control 
bank must be neither a target nor a bidder in megamergers over the same five years, and nor must its 
CEO be changed. 
We match acquiring banks (treatment group) and non-acquiring banks (control group) using a 
one-to-one nearest neighbour PSM with replacement. As shown in Table 3, banks do not arbitrarily 
make their M&A choices, and certain bank characteristics may drive their decisions. PSM enables us 
to find a sample of non-acquiring banks with no significant differences to treatment banks in these 
characteristics, which helps to mitigate the selection bias related to observed bank factors that predict 
M&A occurrence. To calculate the propensity scores for each treatment and control bank, we estimate 
a probit regression in which the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a megamerger is completed in a 
given year, and 0 otherwise. The probit regression controls for all explanatory variables in column 1 of 
Table 3, except that: (1) for DiD estimation of CEO pay in Panel A of Table 7, the level of CEO total 
compensation in column 1 of Table 3 is replaced with the changes in CEO compensation (i.e., ∆Total 
compensation, ∆Equity compensation and ∆Cash compensation) over the three years prior to the 
megamerger completion year; and (2) for DiD estimation of CEO pay sensitivity in Panel B of Table 7, 
it is replaced with the changes in CEO pay sensitivity (i.e., ∆Delta and ∆Vega). This is to ensure the 
satisfaction of parallel trend assumption, a key identifying assumption behind the DiD estimator. It 
requires the same pre-megamerger trend in CEO pay (pay sensitivity) for both the treatment and control 
groups but does not require the level of CEO pay (pay sensitivity) to be identical during the pre-
megamerger era. To ensure the internal growth of non-acquiring banks comparable to the merger-
related growth of acquiring banks, the probit regression additionally controls for bank growth, which is 
defined as the dollar amount of assets acquired in megamergers for treatment banks and as the dollar 
amount of internal asset growth for control banks. After generating the propensity scores and matching 
27 
 
each treatment bank to its nearest-neighbour control bank, we are left with a sample of 45 megamergers 
for the DiD analysis of CEO pay and another sample of 50 megamergers for the DiD analysis of CEO 
pay sensitivity.  
<<Insert Table 7 about here>> 
To test the validity of the matching, we first examine the difference in propensity scores between 
the treatment and control groups. If the control group is properly identified, its propensity score 
distribution should be very similar to that of the treatment group. Table 7 shows that the propensity 
score difference between the two groups is very small. For example, in Panel A, the maximum 
difference in the propensity scores is 0.047, while the 95th percentile of the difference is only 0.010. 
Second, we report the between-group mean differences in the bank characteristics used to estimate 
propensity scores and their corresponding t-statistics. If the matching is valid, the control and treatment 
banks should be alike in these post-matching characteristics. As reported in Table 7, none of them is 
significantly different in their means. In particular, there are no significant between-group differences 
in ∆Total compensation, ∆Equity compensation or ∆Cash compensation in Panel A, ∆Delta or ∆Vega 
in Panel B, which confirms that our matching satisfies the parallel trend assumption. Overall, the 
diagnostic test results justify the validity of our matching approach.  
After obtaining the valid matched pairs, we compute DiD estimators for CEO pay and pay 
sensitivity surrounding megamergers. In Panel A of Table 7, for each CEO pay variable, the mean 
difference before (after) megamerger is computed by subtracting the mean CEO pay of the control 
group from that of the treatment group over the period before (after) the megamerger year. The t-
statistics testing whether the mean difference is equal to 0 are reported in brackets. The mean DiD 
estimators are then calculated by subtracting the between-group mean difference before the megamerger 
year from that after the year. In column 3 of Panel A, total compensation and equity compensation both 
report positive and significant DiD estimators, while the DiD estimator on cash compensation is positive 
but insignificant. The results suggest that the increases in total compensation and equity compensation 
in the post-megamerger period relative to the pre-megamerger period in acquiring banks are of a 
significantly larger magnitude than those in matched non-acquiring banks, but the increase in cash 
compensation surrounding megamergers in acquiring banks does not significantly differ from that in 
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matched control banks. The magnitude of the DiD estimator on total compensation can be interpreted 
that asset growth via megamergers, on average, increases CEO total compensation in acquiring banks 
by $624,000 in the post-megamerger period relative to the pre-megamerger period in comparison to the 
contemporary CEO compensation change in matched non-acquiring banks. In Panel B of Table 7, we 
present DiD estimators for CEO pay sensitivity around megamergers. We document a negative and 
significant DiD estimator on delta, which suggests that CEO firm-related equity wealth in acquiring 
banks becomes less sensitive to stock price after megamergers relative to that in non-acquiring banks. 
Vega reports a statistically insignificant DiD estimator, consistent with our finding that merger growth 
does not significantly affect CEO risk-taking incentives. 
(iv) Robustness Checks 
(a) Controlling for Other Acquirer Characteristics 
Other acquirer characteristics, such as growth opportunity (Guay, 1999), financial policy (Coles et al., 
2006), ownership structure (Hartzell and Starks, 2003) and board monitoring (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2009), may influence CEO compensation. We thus include a set of additional control 
variables to mitigate the potential omitted variable bias related to these observed time-varying acquirer 
characteristics. Specifically, these controls include Market-to-book, Sales growth, Leverage, Cash 
holdings, Institutional ownership, Institutional ownership concentration, Board independence and 
Board size. After they are incorporated into the baseline model, our main findings continue to hold. For 
the additional control variables, we find that banks with large cash holdings pay their CEOs more. The 
concentration of institutional shareholdings significantly reduces bank CEO total compensation but 
increases bank CEO pay–performance sensitivity, which corroborates the argument of Hartzell and 
Starks (2003) that institutional investors play a monitoring role in executive pay-setting process. 
(b) Forms of CEO Compensation 
CEO equity compensation is awarded in the form of stock and stock options. CEO cash compensation 
contains salary and bonus. As in Coles et al. (2006), we compute CEO delta as the sum of stock delta 
and stock option delta, and use stock option vega as a proxy for CEO vega. We then examine the 
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merger–pay relation by assessing the detailed CEO compensation and delta categories: stock 
compensation, stock option compensation, salary, bonus, stock delta and stock option delta. We find 
that merger growth significantly increases stock compensation and stock option compensation, but has 
no significant effect on salary or bonus. The effects of merger growth on stock delta and stock option 
delta are negative and marginally significant. These results generally support our main conclusions. 
(c) Alternative Samples 
Our results are robust to alternative merger samples: (1) the sample excluding mergers in which the 
acquirer’s pre-merger holding of the shares outstanding of the target is more than 20%, (2) alternative 
cut-off points of 30% and 40% regarding the acquirer’s pre-merger holding of the shares outstanding 
of the target, and (3) excluding mergers in which the acquirer owns more than 90% of the shares 
outstanding of the target through a purchase of at least 50%. As another robustness check, we require 
that the bank does not replace its CEO during the three years prior to the merger completion year and 
has at least three years of data over the entire sample period. The analyses repeated using the alternative 
samples report similar results. 
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
(i) High- versus Low-Megamerger Banks 
We compare the merger–pay relation between high- and low-megamerger banks that are split by the 
median dollar value of banks’ total megamerger transactions over the sample period.14 Intuitively, if an 
overall merger policy is set by boards of directors, CEOs who achieve this M&A target should be better 
rewarded. The different M&A goals of banks should generate some cross-sectional variation in the 
merger–pay links. In light of this, we rerun the baseline regressions for the two groups of banks. The 
results in Table 8 show that asset growth through megamergers significantly increases CEO total and 
                                                          
 
14  The results (untabulated) are qualitatively unchanged if the sample is split by the median frequency of 
megamergers made by banks over the sample period. 
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equity compensation across the two groups. Given the same dollar amount of asset growth through 
megamergers, the increases in CEO total and equity compensation in high-megamerger banks are of a 
substantially lower magnitude than those in low-megamerger banks. Specifically, per $1 million of 
assets acquired in megamergers, CEO total compensation increases by $1,978 in low-megamerger 
banks but by only $170 in high-megamerger banks. The results suggest that high-megamerger CEOs 
are discouraged from making too many M&As and that boards of directors employ compensation 
arrangements as an instrument to restrain CEOs’ excessive M&A activity.  
<<Insert Table 8 about here>> 
When turning to look at CEO incentives, we find that the significant decreasing effect of 
megamerger growth on CEO delta only exists in high-megamerger banks, even though CEOs in these 
banks do not gain as large an increase in compensation as CEOs in low-megamerger banks after M&As. 
Megamerger growth significantly increases CEO vega in low-megamerger banks, which suggests that 
CEOs in these banks are given stronger incentives to employ risky investment opportunities. For control 
variables, we find that, compared to CEOs in low-megamerger banks, those in high-megamerger banks 
have their total and equity compensation tied less to firm-specific stock price changes and more to 
accounting returns. As most M&As are accompanied by low stock returns, our results suggest that 
acquiring CEOs in high-megamerger banks tend to capture the boards to make their incentive pay more 
dependent on the relatively better-performing measure (i.e., accounting profit), in line with the finding 
of Morse et al. (2011). 
(ii) ‘Top Five’ Executive Compensation 
Bank CEOs may need the support of other top executives in getting their M&A plans approved by 
boards of directors. By doing so, these non-CEO executives may also receive private benefits from the 
M&A transactions. To warrant a closer investigation of the merger’s effect on executive compensation, 
we examine how merger growth affects the pay and pay sensitivity of ‘top five’ executives. To be 
included in the analysis, a sample bank must have complete data on the pay and pay sensitivity of at 
least five top executives. If the data are available for more than five top executives, we restrict our 
analysis to the five executives with the highest total compensation. We control for the stock ownership 
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of these executives. The untabulated regression results show that asset growth due to mergers is 
positively and significantly associated with the total and equity compensation of top five executives but 
are not significantly related to their cash compensation. Merger growth adds significantly more to 
executive compensation than does non-merger internal growth. For $1 million of new assets acquired 
through megamergers, there is an increment of $686.6 in the total compensation of top five executives; 
while $1 million of internal asset growth increases top five executives’ total compensation by only 
$36.9. About 78% of the increment in the executives’ total compensation due to megamerger growth 
comes in the form of equities. Nonetheless, we do not find that merger growth significantly affects the 
delta or vega of top five executives’ equity portfolios. The above results continue to hold if CEOs are 
excluded from the top five executive pool. Overall, the results suggest that top five executives are better 
rewarded by agreeing with CEOs to make M&As.  
(iii) Are Banks Different from Industrial Firms? 
We ask whether the same M&A effects exist in industrial firms. In Table 9, we investigate the merger–
pay relation in industrial firms.15 The results show that asset growth through mergers significantly 
increases CEO total and equity compensation in industrial firms, consistent with our results for banks. 
In contrast to bank CEOs, for whom we find no significant increases to their cash pay, we find that 
CEOs in industrial firms receive higher cash compensation following M&As. Compared to banks, 
industrial firms face less stringent regulatory scrutiny, which could make the large post-merger cash 
rewards more feasible. In particular, the increases in CEO total and equity compensation due to mergers 
are of a smaller magnitude in industrial firms than in banks. For example, in column 1 of Table 9, the 
coefficient on Assets acquired in megamergers is 0.1297, which is lower than the corresponding 
coefficient of 0.1875 in column 1 of Table 4 for banks. It means that every $1 million of assets acquired 
via megamergers increases CEO total compensation by $57.8(129.7 – 187.5 = –57.8) less in industrial 
firms than in banks. Furthermore, we show that CEO delta and vega in industrial firms are positively 
                                                          
 
15 We also examine non-bank financial firms. The untabulated regression results show that the effects of merger 
growth on CEO pay and pay sensitivity in non-bank financial firms are qualitatively similar to those documented 
in Table 9 for industrial firms. 
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associated with merger growth. The results suggest that, although M&As raise industrial firm CEOs’ 
compensation, their incentives become more aligned with those of shareholders after M&As, indicative 
of a less severe agency problem as a result of M&As in industrial firms than in banks. Overall, the 
results suggest that the merger–pay relation is not completely identical across banks and industrial firms.  
<<Insert Table 9 about here>> 
In Table 10, we use a DiD estimator to delineate the relative impact of merger growth on CEO 
compensation between banks and industrial firms. First, we employ a one-to-one nearest neighbour 
PSM approach to match industrial firm megamergers to bank megamergers we analyse in Table 7. We 
identify the industrial firm megamergers based on the following criteria: (1) the matched acquiring 
industrial firm has similar firm size to the acquiring bank in the year prior to megamerger completion; 
(2) the matched industrial firm megamerger has similar deal value to the bank megamerger; (3) the 
matched acquiring industrial firm has similar firm performance to the acquiring bank in the year prior 
to megamerger completion, so that the relative change in CEO compensation arrangements surrounding 
megamergers for the matched pairs does not result from their different performance; (4) the industrial 
firm has the same CEO over the five-year period centred on the megamerger completion year; and (5) 
the CEO in the matched industrial firm exhibits similar characteristics to the CEO in the treatment bank, 
which ensures that the disparity in pay is not driven by their different characteristics. To fulfil these 
criteria, we control for Total assets before megamergers, Assets acquired in megamergers, Growth 
above industry index, Return on assets, Female CEO, CEO duality, CEO age and CEO shareholding 
in the first-stage probit regression of PSM, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the megamerger 
observation is from a bank, and 0 if it is from an industrial firm. To satisfy the parallel trend assumption 
of the DiD estimator, the probit regression in Panel A of Table 10 additionally controls for ∆Total 
compensation, ∆Equity compensation and ∆Cash compensation over the three years prior to 
megamergers, while the probit regression in Panel B additionally controls for ∆Delta and ∆Vega. 
<<Insert Table 10 about here>> 
In Table 10, we report the propensity score distributions of acquiring banks and matched 
acquiring industrial firms. The two groups show similar propensity score distributions, and none of the 
post-matching between-group mean differences are statistically significant. These diagnostic tests 
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assure us of the validity of the matching. We then calculate the DiD estimators. In column 3 of Panel 
A, the DiD estimator on total compensation is positive and significant, which suggests that bank CEOs, 
on average, receive a significantly larger increase in total compensation due to megamergers than 
industrial firm CEOs. Asset growth through an average megamerger increases bank CEO total 
compensation by $753,000 in the post-megamerger period relative to the pre-megamerger period in 
comparison to the contemporary change in industrial firm CEO total compensation. The DiD estimator 
on equity compensation is significantly positive, while the DiD estimator on cash compensation is 
positive but insignificant. In Panel B, the DiD estimator on delta is significantly negative, which 
indicates that the sensitivity of bank CEOs’ equity wealth to stock price materially declines following 
megamergers, relative to that of industrial firm CEOs. Vega reports an insignificant DiD estimator. 
Collectively, the results suggest that banks are different from industrial firms in terms of the merger–
pay relation.  
(iv) Global Financial Crisis 
The GFC led to large failures in financial institutions. Globally, the seizure of credit became severe. 
Credit became impossibly costly, evidenced by the increased spread of deposit and loan rates, 
liquidation of equities and non-zero interest. Insecurity about asset value prompted capital hoarding, 
drying up liquidity and consequently declining demand and employment. Apparently, the GFC was in 
part attributed to the improper design of executive compensation that fuelled irresponsible corporate 
behaviour, such as bank bonuses that are excessively linked to investment risk taking (Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2014). As former FDIC chairman Sheila Bair stated, ‘The crisis has shown that most financial 
institution compensation systems were not properly linked to risk management. Formula-driven 
compensation allows high short-term profits to be translated into generous bonus payments, without 
regard to any longer-term risks’ (FDIC testimony, 14 January 2010). The GFC magnified the issues of 
bank remuneration and risk taking, and brought renewed scrutiny of executive compensation. In the 
wake of the crisis, the Obama administration passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act to improve financial transparency and executive accountability by curbing excessive pay 
and undue incentives in compensation arrangements awarded by financial institutions. It is worthwhile 
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to study whether the economic shock of the GFC and the resultant changes in regulatory systems have 
had any effect on the merger–pay links.  
In Table 11, we examine the effects of the GFC and post-crisis regulatory reform on the relation 
between bank megamergers and CEO compensation. The full sample is divided into three periods: the 
pre-GFC period from 1992 to 2007, the GFC in 2008, and the post-GFC period from 2009 to 2014.16 In 
Panel A, our main findings for the merger–pay relation generally hold before the crisis. During the crisis, 
the decreasing impact of megamerger growth on CEO equity compensation exceeds its increasing 
impact on the cash compensation, leading to a net decline in the total compensation. As noted, the G20 
identified the improper link between risk management and executive compensation as one of the root 
causes of the GFC. The crisis might have simply revealed the prevailing problems that had long existed 
in bank remuneration systems. During the crisis, regulators could have more closely scrutinised CEOs’ 
self-serving compensation arrangements especially around large capital events, such as M&As, which 
could result in a negative merger–pay relation. In the post-crisis period, CEO pay is positively related 
to asset growth through megamergers, which suggests that M&As serve as an instrument for bank CEOs 
to counter the intended effect of the post-crisis regulatory reform on their compensation. 
<<Insert Table 11 about here>> 
The results for CEO incentives offer us mixed inferences on the effectiveness of the post-crisis 
regulatory reform. Megamerger growth has a negative effect on CEO delta during the GFC, indicating 
that M&As can be used by bank CEOs to disconnect their wealth from the bank’s stock price, which 
dropped severely in the crisis. After the GFC, this negative relation becomes statistically insignificant; 
however, a noticeable increase in CEO vega arises. It appears that government intervention to curb bank 
risk taking fails to discourage acquiring banks from providing their CEOs with risk-taking incentives 
to employ post-crisis new growth opportunities. 
                                                          
 
16 To examine the effects of the GFC and post-crisis regulatory reform, the six-year period after the crisis (2009–
2014) is compared to the six-year period before the GFC (2002–2007). We verify that the regression results for 
the whole pre-crisis period (1992–2007) are consistent with the results for the six-year period prior to the crisis 
(2002–2007) and that the results for 2002–2007 are qualitatively similar to those for another six-year control 
period 1996–2001. This confirms that our results are robust to different six-year control periods before the crisis. 
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The GFC could have a more severe impact on banks than on industrial firms. We test whether the 
results differ across the two groups of firms. First, we identify a control sample of industrial firms using 
a one-to-one nearest neighbour PSM with replacement. The dependent variable in the first-stage probit 
regression is equal to 1 if the firm is from the banking industry, and 0 if it is from a non-financial 
industry. The independent variables in the probit regression include Total assets before megamergers, 
Assets acquired in megamergers, Growth above industry index, Return on assets, Female CEO, CEO 
duality, CEO age and CEO shareholding. After obtaining the propensity scores, we match each bank-
year to its nearest-neighbour industrial-firm-year. We use the matched industrial firm control sample to 
study the effect of the GFC in comparable industrial firms. Panel B of Table 11 shows that the influences 
of the GFC and post-crisis regulatory reform are different for industrial firms in some respects. In 2008, 
the deterring effect of the GFC on CEO pay was absent in industrial firms. This could be because 
industrial firms were accorded less blame for causing the financial crisis and, therefore, their CEO 
compensation practices were less scrutinised by regulators during the crisis. Following the crisis, the 
positive relation between megamerger growth and CEO vega in industrial firms disappears, suggesting 
that industrial firm M&A activity has no significant effect on CEOs’ post-crisis risk-taking incentives. 
6. CONCLUSION 
CEOs may engage in firm-expansion activities to gain favourable compensation arrangements at the 
expense of shareholders. M&As could be one of the key investment channels for CEOs to achieve this 
goal. This paper investigates the potential agency problems inferred from the links between CEO 
compensation and M&As, and compares them with those arising from non-merger internal asset growth. 
We have several findings. First, CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and 
non-merger internal growth, with the latter being significantly smaller in magnitude. Second, CEO delta 
is negatively related to merger growth, indicating that M&As are one way for CEOs to decouple their 
equity wealth from performance. Nonetheless, there is no significant relation between CEO vega and 
merger growth. Third, merger growth adds less to CEO compensation in high-megamerger banks than 
in low-megamerger banks, which suggests that bank boards discourage high merger activity through 
CEO compensation arrangements. Fourth, merger growth in banks increases the total compensation of 
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‘top five’ executives. Fifth, as compared to mergers in industrial firms, bank mergers significantly 
increase CEO compensation but reduce CEO delta. Finally, the post-crisis regulatory reform of 
executive compensation in financial institutions has limited effectiveness in mitigating the merger–pay 
links in banks. 
This paper clarifies the effects of bank mergers on various aspects of CEO compensation, 
complementing the previous literature that has largely focused on the level and composition of the 
compensation. This paper clarifies the unsettled merger–pay relation for CEOs in banks by 
differentiating the effects of the expansion attained in two different ways – namely, M&As and internal 
asset growth. This paper compares bank mergers and industrial firm mergers, and shows that there are 
higher CEO compensation and lower CEO delta after bank mergers relative to matched industrial firm 
mergers, indicative of a more severe agency problem brought by bank mergers. Finally, this paper 
supplements the scarce research on executive compensation and the GFC. There are also policy 
implications. First, CEO rent seeking in compensation should be fully considered and disciplined in 
bank M&A decision making. Second, the established regulations should be enforced or amended for 
the improvement of their effectiveness in restricting the merger–pay links in banks. Third, the 
monitoring role of bank boards in the CEO pay-setting process should be strengthened to protect 
minority shareholders’ interests. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition 
CEO pay: 
Total compensation 
The sum of salary, bonus, value of stock grants, Black-Scholes value of stock option grants, 
other annual compensation (e.g., perquisites and other personal benefits), long-term incentive 
payments and all other compensation (e.g., debt forgiveness and life insurance premiums). 
Source: Execucomp 
Equity compensation The value of stock and stock option grants. Source: Execucomp 
Cash compensation Salary plus bonus. Source: Execucomp 
CEO pay sensitivity: 
Delta 
The dollar change in the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio given a 1% change in 
the stock price. Source: Execucomp 
Vega 
The dollar change in the value of the CEO’s stock option portfolio given a 0.01 change in the 
standard deviation of stock returns. Source: Execucomp 
Asset growth: 
Total assets The book value of total assets. Source: Compustat 
Assets acquired in 
megamergers 
The dollar value of total assets acquired in megamergers over the prior three years. Source: 
SDC 
Non-megamerger growth The dollar value of non-megamerger internal asset growth over the prior three years. 
Assets acquired in all 
mergers 
The dollar value of total assets acquired in all mergers over the prior three years. Source: 
SDC 
Non-merger growth The dollar value of non-merger internal asset growth over the prior three years. 
CEO characteristics: 
Female CEO A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is female, and 0 otherwise. Source: Execucomp 
CEO duality 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO serves as board chair, and 0 otherwise. Source: 
Execucomp 
CEO age The age of the CEO. Source: Execucomp 
CEO shareholding The shares held by the CEO as a percentage of total shares outstanding. Source: Execucomp 
Financial characteristics: 
Change in firm value due 
to change in industry 
index 
The dollar change in the firm’s equity value over the prior three years, given the percentage 
change set equal to the value-weighted banking industry index return. Source: Compustat 
Change in firm value due 
to idiosyncratic change 
The total dollar change in the firm’s equity value over the prior three years minus the dollar 
change in equity value due to industry-wide stock price change. Source: Compustat 
Return on assets Earnings before interest and taxes, divided by total assets. Source: Compustat 
Market-to-book The ratio of market value to book value of equity. Source: Compustat 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets. Source: Compustat 
Sales growth 
The natural logarithm of 1 plus the ratio of sales in the current year to sales in the previous 
year. Source: Compustat 
Cash holdings Cash and short-term investments, divided by total assets. Source: Compustat 
Total assets before 
megamergers 
The book value of total assets in the year prior to megamerger completion year. Source: 
Compustat 
Growth above industry 
index 
The stock return minus the industry index return, where industry is identified using the 
Fama-French 48 industry classification. Source: CRSP 
Corporate governance: 
Institutional ownership 
The shares held by institutional investors as a percentage of total shares outstanding. Source: 
Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings database 
Institutional ownership 
concentration 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of institutional ownership. Source: Thomson Reuters 
Institutional (13f) Holdings database 
Board independence The proportion of independent directors on the board. Source: RiskMetrics 
Board size The number of directors on the board. Source: RiskMetrics 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Bank Mergers 
 
Panel A: Megamerger distribution by year         
Year 
Number of 
megamergers 
Total 
transaction value 
($ billions) 
Average 
transaction value 
($ billions) 
Average ratio of transaction  
value to acquirer’s market 
capitalisation (%) 
Average stock market reaction to 
megamerger announcements (%) 
CAR[̶2,+2] CAR[̶2,+250] 
1992 2 1.74 0.87 55.02 0.75 -18.89 
1993 8 6.70 0.84 30.73 -1.52 -28.30 
1994 5 2.88 0.58 32.42 -5.14 -31.56 
1995 13 1.69 0.13 20.65 -0.55 -4.45 
1996 17 30.07 1.77 36.89 -0.25 11.18 
1997 26 45.50 1.75 36.93 -2.27 1.94 
1998 34 206.35 6.07 41.97 -3.63 -36.32 
1999 11 5.18 0.47 23.53 -5.09 -22.81 
2000 19 71.16 3.75 29.55 -2.27 31.36 
2001 17 29.16 1.72 26.36 -1.75 9.36 
2002 5 5.78 1.16 25.66 0.54 -31.37 
2003 8 9.77 1.22 23.98 -1.84 -10.77 
2004 24 136.03 5.67 33.64 -2.67 -1.95 
2005 11 10.50 0.95 20.37 -0.83 -9.47 
2006 18 53.04 2.95 26.13 -1.70 -8.37 
2007 10 15.67 1.57 29.78 -1.00 -1.23 
2008 10 22.38 2.24 23.20 0.64 33.27 
2009 1 0.54 0.54 64.81 41.70 109.12 
2010 2 0.96 0.48 13.35 5.48 -16.21 
2011 8 4.88 0.61 42.84 -3.53 0.06 
2012 8 16.32 2.04 22.66 0.49 20.86 
2013 7 2.68 0.38 41.47 0.02 7.67 
2014 7 3.46 0.49 34.59 -1.85 -6.68 
All years 271 682.45 2.52 31.62 -1.71 -3.41 
Panel B: Merger distribution by year     
Year 
Number of  
mergers 
Total 
transaction value 
($ billions) 
Average 
transaction value 
($ billions) 
Average ratio of transaction  
value to acquirer’s market 
capitalisation (%) 
Average stock market reaction to 
merger announcements (%) 
CAR[̶2,+2] CAR[̶2,+250] 
1992 11 2.48 0.23 12.01 -1.45 -28.25 
1993 38 9.83 0.26 8.68 -0.36 -22.30 
1994 35 5.52 0.16 6.60 -0.70 -6.51 
1995 49 5.14 0.10 7.08 -0.17 0.13 
1996 70 36.48 0.52 10.94 -0.13 9.48 
1997 73 51.14 0.70 15.37 -0.75 6.97 
1998 117 221.93 1.90 14.41 -1.70 -33.68 
1999 76 18.15 0.24 5.80 -2.06 -28.35 
2000 55 81.26 1.48 11.69 -0.97 40.22 
2001 58 41.71 0.72 9.90 -0.55 -2.69 
2002 47 22.25 0.47 5.32 -0.91 -21.57 
2003 35 20.61 0.59 7.50 -0.41 -11.50 
2004 60 143.37 2.39 15.52 -1.31 -4.23 
2005 44 16.10 0.37 7.92 -0.93 -9.68 
2006 55 66.07 1.20 11.33 -0.84 -6.12 
2007 46 58.37 1.27 8.96 -0.93 -18.08 
2008 22 31.84 1.45 12.84 0.46 22.09 
2009 9 6.99 0.78 10.34 9.18 -44.64 
2010 9 3.84 0.43 4.79 -0.99 -4.88 
2011 14 6.45 0.46 26.37 -2.36 7.22 
2012 27 17.87 0.66 9.03 0.22 1.70 
2013 23 3.48 0.15 15.25 0.77 1.68 
2014 23 5.11 0.22 13.88 -0.69 -9.45 
All years 996 876.01 0.88 10.85 -0.78 -7.51 
Notes: 
This table presents bank merger distribution and deal characteristics by merger completion year. Panel A reports the statistics 
of megamergers, whose transaction value is no less than 10% of the market capitalisation of the acquiring bank measured 20 
trading days prior to the merger announcement date. Panel B reports the statistics of all bank mergers. The average stock 
market reaction to merger announcements is assessed by the CARs over two different periods from day –2 to +2 and from –2 
to +250 (in trading days), where day 0 is the merger announcement date. The expected return used to compute the CAR comes 
from a market model with the CRSP value-weighted index return as the market return over an estimation window [–250,–20]. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Banks 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean SD P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
CEO pay:         
Total compensation ($ millions) 1753 4.046 5.328 0.381 1.199 2.214 4.585 23.260 
Equity compensation ($ millions) 1753 2.119 4.175 0.000 0.117 0.735 2.280 17.000 
Cash compensation ($ millions) 1753 1.273 1.332 0.279 0.650 0.907 1.324 7.975 
CEO pay sensitivity:         
Delta ($ millions) 1720 0.507 1.015 0.003 0.066 0.195 0.510 4.410 
Vega ($ millions) 1718 0.126 0.228 0.000 0.010 0.036 0.124 1.232 
Asset growth:          
Total assets at t 3̶ ($ billions) 1753 50.925 193.008 0.567 4.154 8.853 26.078 1198.942 
Assets acquired in megamergers ($ billions) 1753 1.026 5.699 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.108 32.790 
Non-megamerger growth ($ billions) 1753 16.680 69.010 -9.741 0.627 2.163 7.317 373.300 
Assets acquired in all mergers ($ billions) 1753 1.283 6.211 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.352 32.790 
Non-merger growth ($ billions) 1753 16.430 68.280 -9.741 0.605 2.138 7.086 373.300 
CEO characteristics:         
Female CEO 1753 0.025 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CEO duality 1753 0.637 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CEO age 1753 57.200 6.808 40.000 53.000 57.000 62.000 76.000 
CEO shareholding 1753 0.012 0.029 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.147 
Financial characteristics:         
Change in firm value due to change in 
industry index ($ billions) 
1753 1.556 7.294 -15.660 -0.074 0.286 1.278 30.950 
Change in firm value due to idiosyncratic 
change ($ billions) 
1753 0.637 6.216 -19.120 -0.353 0.122 0.686 34.370 
Return on assets 1753 0.025 0.027 -0.022 0.018 0.023 0.028 0.157 
Market-to-book 1753 1.963 1.564 0.209 1.195 1.668 2.351 7.549 
Leverage 1743 0.177 0.104 0.016 0.096 0.165 0.242 0.475 
Sales growth 1751 0.730 0.095 0.543 0.673 0.717 0.769 1.077 
Cash holdings 1753 0.068 0.087 0.005 0.025 0.041 0.072 0.493 
Corporate governance:         
Institutional ownership 1560 0.557 0.189 0.154 0.420 0.561 0.688 1.000 
Institutional ownership concentration 1560 0.058 0.052 0.019 0.034 0.045 0.063 0.245 
Board independence 1332 0.745 0.130 0.364 0.667 0.769 0.846 0.929 
Board size 1332 12.730 3.245 7.000 10.000 12.000 15.000 19.000 
Notes: 
This table presents descriptive statistics of 184 sample banks for the period 1992–2014. Panel A reports the statistics of the 
firm-year sample. Panel B reports the average pay and pay sensitivity of bank CEOs by sample year. See the appendix for 
variable definitions.
Panel B: CEO pay and pay sensitivity by year 
Year 
Total 
compensation 
($ millions) 
Equity 
compensation 
($ millions) 
Cash 
compensation 
($ millions) 
Ratio of equity 
compensation to 
total compensation 
Ratio of cash 
compensation to 
total compensation 
Delta 
($ millions) 
Vega 
($ millions) 
1992 2.272 0.942 1.084 0.415 0.477 0.118 0.042 
1993 2.204 0.459 1.307 0.180 0.643 0.240 0.034 
1994 2.598 1.207 1.147 0.338 0.567 0.226 0.035 
1995 2.172 0.547 1.329 0.224 0.660 0.379 0.040 
1996 3.233 1.203 1.530 0.317 0.557 0.456 0.041 
1997 3.908 1.931 1.554 0.363 0.527 0.653 0.032 
1998 4.549 2.457 1.581 0.435 0.460 0.652 0.079 
1999 5.799 3.967 1.552 0.464 0.463 0.528 0.113 
2000 5.942 3.806 1.634 0.423 0.492 0.905 0.135 
2001 5.236 3.083 1.723 0.478 0.452 0.803 0.185 
2002 4.754 2.721 1.673 0.432 0.495 0.700 0.219 
2003 4.710 2.527 1.919 0.403 0.526 0.878 0.245 
2004 4.666 2.147 1.963 0.346 0.542 0.917 0.221 
2005 4.527 2.096 1.876 0.330 0.570 0.817 0.211 
2006 5.026 2.562 1.011 0.312 0.416 0.640 0.173 
2007 3.749 2.081 0.975 0.324 0.456 0.436 0.132 
2008 2.977 1.670 0.724 0.328 0.471 0.246 0.092 
2009 2.515 1.285 0.824 0.277 0.552 0.215 0.082 
2010 3.217 1.429 1.056 0.261 0.537 0.263 0.103 
2011 3.507 1.749 0.963 0.324 0.447 0.222 0.091 
2012 3.580 1.707 0.959 0.316 0.431 0.255 0.096 
2013 3.913 1.955 0.904 0.355 0.375 0.368 0.091 
2014 4.175 2.119 1.012 0.367 0.364 0.418 0.083 
All years 4.046 2.119 1.273 0.349 0.482 0.507 0.126 
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Table 3 
Determinants of Bank Merger Announcements 
 
DV= Megamerger announcement 
 Panel A: Probit  Panel B: Firm-fixed effects 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]   [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Return on assets 2.1952 2.4085 2.4357 1.7250 1.7959  0.9912 1.0563 1.0166 0.8437 0.8763 
 [1.04] [1.12] [1.19] [0.80] [0.83]  [0.94] [1.00] [0.98] [0.79] [0.82] 
Market-to-book -0.0466 -0.0420 -0.0295 -0.0421 -0.0390  0.0012 0.0020 0.0033 0.0020 0.0026 
 [-1.24] [-1.13] [-1.06] [-1.17] [-1.09]  [0.29] [0.50] [0.85] [0.51] [0.66] 
Leverage 0.5998 0.5929 0.4704 0.5656 0.5617  0.2213 0.1899 0.1616 0.2082 0.1778 
 [0.94] [0.92] [0.75] [0.88] [0.87]  [0.94] [0.80] [0.69] [0.89] [0.75] 
Sales growth 0.6545 0.5628 0.9753 0.7318 0.6548  -0.0247 -0.0325 0.0152 -0.0112 -0.0176 
 [1.11] [0.96] [1.64] [1.25] [1.11]  [-0.22] [-0.28] [0.12] [-0.09] [-0.14] 
Cash holdings -2.5299*** -2.5088*** -2.2035*** -2.5579*** -2.5479***  -0.1644 -0.2160 -0.1666 -0.1574 -0.2087 
 [-3.25] [-3.34] [-3.07] [-3.26] [-3.40]  [-0.57] [-0.81] [-0.58] [-0.55] [-0.79] 
Ln(Total assets) -0.2386*** -0.1925*** -0.2101*** -0.2648*** -0.2271***  -0.1883*** -0.1804*** -0.1908*** -0.1977*** -0.1918*** 
 [-4.31] [-3.63] [-3.65] [-4.23] [-3.99]  [-3.82] [-3.70] [-3.80] [-3.98] [-3.89] 
Institutional ownership -0.1603 -0.1463 -0.0497 -0.0990 -0.0676  0.1733 0.1899 0.2343* 0.2217 0.2410* 
 [-0.40] [-0.37] [-0.12] [-0.24] [-0.16]  [1.23] [1.38] [1.67] [1.60] [1.73] 
Institutional ownership concentration -3.2694 -3.5050 -3.5574 -3.3249 -3.5049  -0.3266 -0.3480 -0.3999 -0.4034 -0.4286 
 [-1.40] [-1.51] [-1.48] [-1.38] [-1.45]  [-0.74] [-0.79] [-0.88] [-0.88] [-0.94] 
Board independence -0.8242 -0.8056 -0.8107 -0.8302 -0.8146  -0.1778 -0.1777 -0.1666 -0.1708 -0.1703 
 [-1.44] [-1.42] [-1.45] [-1.45] [-1.44]  [-1.58] [-1.58] [-1.51] [-1.56] [-1.56] 
Board size 0.0287 0.0277 0.0252 0.0281 0.0272  -0.0060 -0.0056 -0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0056 
 [1.37] [1.33] [1.19] [1.30] [1.27]  [-1.02] [-0.96] [-0.95] [-1.00] [-0.95] 
Female CEO 0.1084 0.1092 0.0645 0.0860 0.0832  0.0263 0.0303 0.0327 0.0301 0.0326 
 [0.27] [0.27] [0.16] [0.21] [0.21]  [0.20] [0.22] [0.24] [0.23] [0.24] 
CEO duality -0.0531 -0.0476 -0.0539 -0.0708 -0.0691  -0.0062 -0.0022 -0.0166 -0.0186 -0.0159 
 [-0.38] [-0.35] [-0.38] [-0.50] [-0.49]  [-0.24] [-0.09] [-0.65] [-0.70] [-0.61] 
CEO age -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0012  -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0006 
 [-0.11] [-0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.13]  [-0.15] [0.12] [-0.58] [-0.50] [-0.29] 
CEO shareholding -4.8932 -5.0265 -4.2717 -4.0266 -4.0842  0.3870 0.3523 0.3449 0.2841 0.2365 
 [-1.27] [-1.35] [-1.33] [-1.41] [-1.43]  [0.90] [0.83] [0.75] [0.61] [0.51] 
Total compensation ($ millions) 0.0475***   0.0358***   0.0089***   0.0061**  
 [4.06]   [3.01]   [3.08]   [2.35]  
Equity compensation ($ millions)  0.0577***   0.0450***   0.0102***   0.0072** 
  [3.47]   [3.01]   [2.87]   [2.23] 
Cash compensation ($ millions)  -0.0315   -0.0499   -0.0069   -0.0086 
  [-0.45]   [-0.75]   [-0.61]   [-0.92] 
Delta ($ millions)   -0.0410 -0.0537 -0.0581    0.0024 0.0008 0.0021 
   [-0.47] [-0.46] [-0.54]    [0.16] [0.05] [0.14] 
Vega ($ millions)   0.8108*** 0.5236** 0.6037**    0.2382*** 0.2040*** 0.2083*** 
   [3.36] [2.08] [2.25]    [3.93] [3.49] [3.42] 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12  0.1079 0.1082 0.1137 0.1173 0.1182 
N 1144 1144 1132 1132 1132   1144 1144 1132 1132 1132 
Notes: 
This table presents regressions results on the determinants of bank merger announcements. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a megamerger announcement is made by a bank in a given year, 
and 0 otherwise. The regressions in Panel A are estimated using a probit model. The regressions in Panel B are estimated using a linear probability model with firm-level fixed effects. All 
independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. Intercepts and year dummies are included in all regressions but suppressed for brevity. See the appendix for 
variable definitions. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4 
Bank Mergers and CEO Compensation 
 
  Panel A: CEO pay   Panel B: CEO pay sensitivity 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  [7] [8] [9] [10] 
  
Total 
compensation 
Total 
compensation 
Equity 
compensation 
Equity 
compensation 
Cash 
compensation 
Cash 
compensation 
  Delta Delta Vega Vega 
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
0.0050*** 0.0047** 0.0044*** 0.0041*** 0.0008 0.0007  0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 
 [3.30] [2.57] [4.90] [3.56] [1.05] [1.04]  [0.82] [0.91] [0.82] [0.82] 
Assets acquired in 
megamergers ($ millions) 
0.1875***  0.1684***  0.0239   -0.0165**  -0.0008  
 [5.11]  [2.99]  [0.74]   [-2.03]  [-0.17]  
Assets acquired in all mergers 
($ millions) 
 0.1741***  0.1510***  0.0226   -0.0157*  -0.0010 
  [7.08]  [4.00]  [0.72]   [-1.89]  [-0.21] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
0.0135***  0.0097*  0.0026***   0.0027***  0.0014***  
 [3.04]  [1.80]  [3.90]   [3.55]  [5.03]  
Non-merger growth  
($ millions) 
 0.0124***  0.0090*  0.0024***   0.0029***  0.0014*** 
  [3.22]  [1.79]  [2.65]   [3.11]  [4.61] 
Change in firm value due to 
change in industry index 
($ millions) 
0.1482*** 0.1602*** 0.0727*** 0.0850*** 0.0466*** 0.0480***  0.0282*** 0.0270*** 0.0079*** 0.0079*** 
 [6.88] [6.78] [3.78] [3.73] [4.01] [4.65]  [5.19] [5.42] [2.69] [2.87] 
Change in firm value due to 
idiosyncratic change 
($ millions) 
0.1056*** 0.1147*** 0.0522** 0.0618** 0.0323*** 0.0334***  0.0159* 0.0150* 0.0019 0.0019 
 [4.69] [4.86] [2.18] [2.28] [4.66] [5.25]  [1.95] [1.88] [0.82] [0.84] 
Return on assets (×105) 0.2866*** 0.2788*** 0.2613*** 0.2531*** -0.0060 -0.0068  0.0218 0.0225 0.0100** 0.0101** 
 [3.60] [3.46] [2.87] [2.75] [-0.58] [-0.65]  [1.36] [1.42] [2.39] [2.41] 
Female CEO (×103) -0.5712 -0.5638 -0.4181 -0.4106 -0.1837** -0.1829*  -0.1282 -0.1290 -0.0105 -0.0105 
 [-1.51] [-1.50] [-1.43] [-1.43] [-1.98] [-1.97]  [-1.39] [-1.39] [-0.48] [-0.48] 
CEO duality (×103) 1.6381*** 1.6342*** 0.9633*** 0.9584*** 0.3476*** 0.3473***  0.1648*** 0.1650*** 0.0736*** 0.0736*** 
 [4.73] [4.76] [3.70] [3.74] [5.54] [5.54]  [3.48] [3.48] [3.82] [3.83] 
CEO age (×103) -0.0088 -0.0093 -0.0180 -0.0184 0.0044 0.0043  0.0231 0.0231 0.0006 0.0006 
 [-0.48] [-0.51] [-1.55] [-1.58] [1.08] [1.07]  [1.60] [1.60] [0.55] [0.57] 
CEO shareholding (×105) -0.1033* -0.1011* -0.0447 -0.0431 -0.0272** -0.0269**  0.1277*** 0.1274*** -0.0033 -0.0033 
 [-1.73] [-1.69] [-0.98] [-0.94] [-2.28] [-2.24]  [2.88] [2.88] [-1.05] [-1.06] 
Adj. R2 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.34 0.34  0.33 0.33 0.44 0.44 
N 1753 1753 1753 1753 1753 1753   1720 1720 1718 1718 
Notes: 
This table presents OLS regressions of CEO pay and pay sensitivity on merger growth and control variables. Intercepts and year dummies are included in all regressions but suppressed for brevity. 
The dependent variables are in thousands of U.S. dollars. See the appendix for variable definitions. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Bank Mergers and CEO Compensation (Firm-Fixed Effects) 
 
 Panel A: CEO pay  Panel B: CEO pay sensitivity 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  [7] [8] [9] [10] 
 Total 
compensation 
Total 
compensation 
Equity 
compensation 
Equity 
compensation 
Cash 
compensation 
Cash 
compensation 
 Delta Delta Vega Vega 
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
-0.0005 -0.0009 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0012  0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
 [-0.35] [-0.50] [0.97] [0.47] [-1.45] [-1.50]  [0.32] [0.40] [0.29] [0.22] 
Assets acquired in megamergers 
($ millions) 
0.1265*  0.1270*  0.0096   -0.0135**  -0.0004  
 [1.82]  [1.72]  [0.33]   [-2.23]  [-0.10]  
Assets acquired in all mergers 
($ millions) 
 0.1054**  0.1049**  0.0099   -0.0119**  -0.0013 
  [2.18]  [2.04]  [0.36]   [-2.08]  [-0.33] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
0.0199  0.0166  -0.0024**   0.0015**  0.0007***  
 [1.16]  [1.04]  [-2.05]   [2.02]  [5.12]  
Non-merger growth 
($ millions) 
 0.0199  0.0167  -0.0026*   0.0015*  0.0008*** 
  [1.19]  [1.08]  [-1.89]   [1.93]  [4.71] 
Change in firm value due to 
change in industry index 
($ millions) 
0.0638*** 0.0772*** 0.0196 0.0333 0.0224** 0.0232***  0.0229*** 0.0215*** 0.0029 0.0030 
 [4.22] [3.56] [1.10] [1.27] [2.39] [3.10]  [5.29] [5.17] [0.93] [1.02] 
Change in firm value due to 
idiosyncratic change ($ millions) 
0.0698** 0.0801*** 0.0332 0.0438 0.0260*** 0.0266***  0.0140* 0.0129* 0.0001 0.0003 
 [2.34] [2.78] [1.09] [1.43] [3.72] [4.08]  [1.87] [1.76] [0.05] [0.11] 
Return on assets (×105) 0.2672*** 0.2609*** 0.2186** 0.2120** 0.0487*** 0.0486***  0.0384* 0.0389* 0.0080* 0.0078* 
 [2.67] [2.66] [2.46] [2.44] [3.67] [3.64]  [1.88] [1.89] [1.80] [1.77] 
Female CEO (×103) -0.5867 -0.5779 -0.0758 -0.0665 -0.3540* -0.3547*  0.0191 0.0190 -0.0122 -0.0116 
 [-0.67] [-0.66] [-0.21] [-0.19] [-1.97] [-1.97]  [0.21] [0.20] [-0.35] [-0.33] 
CEO duality (×103) 0.3163 0.3013 0.1214 0.1064 0.1298* 0.1296*  0.0688 0.0699 0.0281 0.0278 
 [0.65] [0.63] [0.29] [0.27] [1.73] [1.73]  [1.23] [1.25] [1.13] [1.12] 
CEO age (×103) 0.0220 0.0218 -0.0161 -0.0162 0.0134* 0.0132*  0.0215*** 0.0216*** 0.0041** 0.0041*** 
 [0.90] [0.89] [-0.93] [-0.94] [1.89] [1.83]  [2.62] [2.63] [2.58] [2.65] 
CEO shareholding (×105) 0.0877 0.0885 0.0909 0.0918 -0.0105 -0.0103  0.0553*** 0.0552*** 0.0035 0.0034 
 [1.44] [1.45] [1.63] [1.65] [-0.76] [-0.75]  [3.88] [3.87] [1.22] [1.21] 
Adj. R2 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.20  0.27 0.27 0.32 0.32 
N 1753 1753 1753 1753 1753 1753  1720 1720 1718 1718 
Notes: 
This table presents firm-fixed effects regressions of CEO pay and pay sensitivity on merger growth and control variables. Intercepts and year dummies are included in all regressions but suppressed 
for brevity. The dependent variables are in thousands of U.S. dollars. See the appendix for variable definitions. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Bank Mergers and CEO Compensation (Dynamic OLS and GMM) 
 
Panel A: CEO pay Dynamic OLS   Dynamic panel GMM 
 [1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] [6] 
Pay measure= 
Total 
compensation 
Equity 
compensation 
Cash 
compensation 
  
Total 
compensation 
Equity 
compensation 
Cash 
compensation 
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
0.0023*** 0.0024*** 0.0006  0.0040 0.0040 0.0013** 
 [3.25] [5.47] [1.18]  [1.29] [1.32] [2.22] 
Assets acquired in 
megamergers 
($ millions) 
0.1517** 0.1471* 0.0174  0.2523** 0.2978*** 0.0260 
 [2.05] [1.80] [0.76]  [2.32] [3.18] [0.81] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
-0.0047 0.0004 -0.0018  -0.0017 -0.0040 0.0008 
 [-1.13] [0.08] [-1.03]  [-0.31] [-0.72] [0.68] 
Change in firm value due 
to change in industry 
index ($ millions) 
0.0850*** 0.0517** 0.0135**  0.0529 0.0321 -0.0098 
 [2.91] [2.18] [2.47]  [1.33] [0.69] [-1.13] 
Change in firm value due 
to idiosyncratic change 
($ millions) 
0.1189*** 0.0683** 0.0175***  0.0589 0.0237 -0.0263** 
 [3.41] [2.29] [2.75]  [1.28] [0.54] [-2.57] 
Return on assets (×105) 0.0556 0.1073** -0.0063  0.1391 0.0815 -0.0383 
 [1.40] [2.45] [-1.20]  [0.48] [0.20] [-0.86] 
Female CEO (×103) -0.1006 -0.0968 -0.0937  -0.2372 0.0599 -0.3387 
 [-0.38] [-0.66] [-1.42]  [-0.12] [0.02] [-1.53] 
CEO duality (×103) 0.5780*** 0.4495** 0.0614  0.8926 1.0140 0.3286 
 [2.76] [2.42] [1.57]  [0.75] [1.04] [1.55] 
CEO age (×103) -0.0043 -0.0119 0.0023  -0.0122 -0.0085 0.0187 
 [-0.42] [-1.48] [1.01]  [-0.20] [-0.16] [1.53] 
CEO shareholding 
(×105) 
-0.0485 -0.0291 -0.0105  0.2307 0.2481 -0.0168 
 [-1.48] [-0.87] [-1.27]  [1.03] [1.39] [-0.64] 
Pay measure (lag 1) 0.4466*** 0.3461*** 0.6486***  0.5021*** 0.3954** 0.4754*** 
 [12.45] [5.45] [8.55]  [4.27] [2.37] [6.60] 
Pay measure (lag 2) 0.2323*** 0.1761*** 0.0793  0.0728 0.0300  
 [9.33] [6.31] [0.79]  [1.44] [0.39]  
Adj. R2 0.63 0.49 0.64     
N 1500 1500 1500  1500 1500 1630 
AR(1)         -3.09*** -2.33** -1.81* 
AR(2)     -0.68 -0.06 -1.04 
Hansen J         21.35 25.40 11.74 
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Panel B: CEO pay sensitivity Dynamic OLS  Dynamic panel GMM 
 [1] [2]  [3] [4] 
Pay sensitivity measure= Delta Vega  Delta Vega 
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
-0.0000 0.0000  -0.0003*** -0.0000 
 [-0.18] [1.31]  [-2.62] [-0.32] 
Assets acquired in megamergers 
($ millions) 
-0.0045** -0.0009  -0.0103*** -0.0127 
 [-2.00] [-0.79]  [-3.64] [-0.92] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
-0.0003 -0.0001  0.0010** 0.0002 
 [-0.81] [-0.61]  [2.48] [0.79] 
Change in firm value due to change in 
industry index ($ millions) 
0.0121*** 0.0017**  0.0085** 0.0003 
 [5.03] [2.39]  [2.56] [0.21] 
Change in firm value due to idiosyncratic 
change ($ millions) 
0.0101*** 0.0027**  0.0017 0.0003 
 [3.01] [2.09]  [0.57] [0.11] 
Return on assets (×105) -0.0071 0.0013  -0.0060 -0.0058 
 [-1.49] [0.95]  [-0.36] [-0.92] 
Female CEO (×103) 0.0142 -0.0060  0.0611 -0.0188 
 [0.65] [-0.74]  [0.56] [-0.32] 
CEO duality (×103) 0.0434* 0.0104  0.0176 -0.0259 
 [1.74] [1.53]  [0.29] [-0.73] 
CEO age (×103) 0.0043 0.0005  -0.0010 -0.0007 
 [1.53] [1.12]  [-0.22] [-0.40] 
CEO shareholding (×105) 0.0125 -0.0018  -0.0384** 0.0058 
 [0.78] [-1.49]  [-2.46] [0.88] 
Pay sensitivity measure (lag 1) 0.9094*** 0.8337***  0.9783*** 0.9522*** 
 [24.47] [10.93]  [15.74] [11.09] 
Pay sensitivity measure (lag 2) 0.0763 0.0743    
 [1.14] [1.16]    
Adj. R2 0.87 0.84    
N 1436 1437  1578 1577 
AR(1)    -2.35** -2.58** 
AR(2)    -1.13 0.98 
Hansen J    20.29 26.28 
Notes: 
This table presents regressions of CEO pay and pay sensitivity on megamerger growth and control variables. The regressions 
are estimated using dynamic OLS and two-step dynamic panel system GMM estimators, respectively. Intercepts and year 
dummies are included in all regressions but suppressed for brevity. In the dynamic OLS model, lagged dependent variables 
are included as regressors, and the t-statistics in brackets are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. In the dynamic 
panel GMM estimation, all independent variables are treated as endogenous except for year dummies, and these endogenous 
variables are instrumented by two of their past values; the t-statistics in brackets are based on finite-sample corrected robust 
standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005). The dependent variables are in thousands of U.S. dollars. See the appendix for variable 
definitions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Bank Mergers and CEO Compensation (DiD Analysis) 
 
Panel A: DiD tests for CEO pay 
Estimated propensity score distributions: 
Propensity scores N Min P5 Median Mean P95 Max SD 
Treatment 45 0.008 0.032 0.150 0.159 0.285 0.426 0.088 
Control 45 0.008 0.032 0.145 0.157 0.287 0.428 0.087 
Difference ̶ 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.047 0.007 
Post-matching mean differences: 
Variable Treatment Control Difference t-statistic 
Return on assets 0.026 0.024 0.002 0.679 
Market-to-book 2.336 2.305 0.031 0.098 
Leverage 0.188 0.187 0.001 0.056 
Sales growth 0.737 0.752 -0.015 -0.884 
Cash holdings 0.069 0.055 0.014 0.802 
Ln(Total assets) 9.445 9.317 0.128 0.501 
Institutional ownership 0.536 0.556 -0.021 -0.502 
Institutional ownership 
concentration 
0.048 0.046 0.002 0.416 
Board independence 0.695 0.731 -0.037 -1.484 
Board size 13.400 12.733 0.667 0.954 
Female CEO 0.000 0.000 0.000                         ̶
CEO duality 0.711 0.644 0.067 0.671 
CEO age 56.133 54.711 1.422 1.185 
CEO shareholding 0.008 0.009 -0.001 -0.387 
Bank growth ($ billions) 2.843 3.175 -0.332 -0.185 
Δ Total compensation ($ millions) 0.995 0.354 0.640 1.205 
Δ Equity compensation ($ millions) 0.778 -0.103 0.882 1.621 
Δ Cash compensation ($ millions) 0.119 0.345 -0.226 -1.338 
DiD estimators: 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Mean difference before megamerger Mean difference after megamerger Mean DiD estimator 
  (treatment  ̶  control) (treatment  ̶  control) (after  ̶  before) 
Total compensation 550 1174 624* 
 [0.58] [1.08] [1.70] 
Equity compensation 106 407* 301* 
 [0.51] [1.95] [1.70] 
Cash compensation -2 15 17 
  [-0.01] [0.05] [0.12] 
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Panel B: DiD tests for CEO pay sensitivity 
Estimated propensity score distributions: 
Propensity scores N Min P5 Median Mean P95 Max SD 
Treatment 50 0.012 0.037 0.160 0.174 0.364 0.473 0.103 
Control 50 0.012 0.038 0.159 0.176 0.361 0.461 0.103 
Difference ̶ 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.023 0.046 0.008 
Post-matching mean differences: 
Variable Treatment Control Difference t-statistic 
Return on assets 0.026 0.031 -0.005 -1.119 
Market-to-book 2.085 2.426 -0.340 -1.176 
Leverage 0.190 0.184 0.007 0.369 
Sales growth 0.741 0.724 0.018 1.169 
Cash holdings 0.058 0.067 -0.009 -0.855 
Ln(Total assets) 9.862 9.616 0.247 0.895 
Institutional ownership 0.541 0.560 -0.019 -0.497 
Institutional ownership 
concentration 
0.046 0.046 -0.000 -0.035 
Board independence 0.707 0.727 -0.020 -0.788 
Board size 13.740 13.760 -0.020 -0.029 
Female CEO 0.000 0.020 -0.020 -1.000 
CEO duality 0.720 0.740 -0.020 -0.223 
CEO age 57.020 57.400 -0.380 -0.302 
CEO shareholding 0.007 0.008 -0.000 -0.059 
Bank growth ($ billions) 3.752 5.606 -1.854 -0.527 
Δ Delta ($ millions) 0.115 0.120 -0.005 -0.048 
Δ Vega ($ millions) 0.018 0.005 0.013 0.358 
DiD estimators: 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Mean difference before megamerger Mean difference after megamerger Mean DiD estimator 
  (treatment  ̶  control) (treatment  ̶  control) (after   ̶ before) 
Delta 110 -88 -198* 
 [0.76] [-0.48] [-1.82] 
Vega 67 42 -25 
  [1.19] [0.99] [-0.61] 
Notes: 
This table presents DiD estimators of the impact of megamerger growth on CEO pay and pay sensitivity. Treatment banks 
(acquiring banks) and control banks (non-acquiring banks) are matched within the same year, using a one-to-one nearest 
neighbour propensity score matching with replacement. The DiD estimators are calculated in a five-year event window 
surrounding the megamerger completion year. The mean difference before (after) megamerger is computed by subtracting the 
mean of the control group from that of the treatment group over the period before (after) megamerger. The DiD estimator is 
then computed by subtracting the between-group mean difference before megamerger from that after megamerger. The t-
statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are given in brackets, testing whether the mean difference is equal 
to 0. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The DiD estimators are 
reported in thousands of U.S. dollars. See the appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 8 
High- versus Low-Megamerger Banks 
 
 Panel A: CEO pay  Panel B: CEO pay sensitivity 
 Total compensation  Equity compensation  Cash compensation  Delta  Vega 
  High Low   High Low   High Low   High Low  High Low 
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
0.0040*** 0.0548***  0.0038*** 0.0346***  0.0005 0.0093***  0.0004 0.0080  0.0001 0.0022*** 
 [3.16] [4.85]  [5.11] [3.81]  [0.69] [4.23]  [0.69] [1.27]  [0.59] [2.96] 
Assets acquired in megamergers 
($ millions) 
0.1704*** 1.9776***  0.1582** 2.0908***  0.0146 0.0203  -0.0102** -0.3440  -0.0023 0.0388*** 
 [4.03] [5.28]  [2.57] [5.86]  [0.46] [0.45]  [-2.24] [-1.58]  [-0.51] [2.89] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
0.0137*** 0.0453  0.0098* 0.0254  0.0026*** 0.0054  0.0026*** 0.0865*  0.0014*** 0.0025 
 [2.95] [0.96]  [1.74] [0.74]  [3.48] [0.78]  [3.55] [1.92]  [5.10] [1.13] 
Change in firm value due to change in industry index 
($ millions) 
0.1620*** 0.0542**  0.0816*** 0.0392*  0.0569*** -0.0073  0.0316*** 0.0119  0.0093*** 0.0003 
 [8.38] [2.33]  [4.55] [1.76]  [4.69] [-1.25]  [10.61] [0.89]  [3.05] [0.17] 
Change in firm value due to idiosyncratic change 
($ millions) 
0.1052*** 0.1513***  0.0517** 0.1146**  0.0400*** -0.0038  0.0114** 0.0278  0.0034 -0.0024 
 [4.49] [2.69]  [2.13] [2.35]  [5.41] [-0.39]  [2.07] [1.31]  [1.32] [-0.97] 
Return on assets (×105) 0.4834*** 0.2206***  0.4937*** 0.1504**  0.0085 0.0264***  0.0696* -0.0055  0.0186** 0.0118*** 
 [3.42] [2.97]  [3.23] [2.12]  [0.28] [2.87]  [1.85] [-0.28]  [2.50] [3.95] 
Female CEO (×103) -1.0716*** -0.0548  -0.3537 -0.2015  -0.1821 -0.2509**  0.0091 -0.0677  -0.0274* 0.0014 
 [-3.34] [-0.11]  [-1.18] [-0.53]  [-1.29] [-2.15]  [0.17] [-0.43]  [-1.95] [0.04] 
CEO duality (×103) 1.7916*** 0.6830**  1.0147*** 0.3709  0.3911*** 0.1836**  0.1418** 0.0674  0.0740*** 0.0398** 
 [3.77] [2.09]  [2.77] [1.58]  [4.65] [2.08]  [2.23] [0.58]  [2.72] [2.36] 
CEO age (×103) -0.0177 -0.0092  -0.0202 -0.0257*  0.0019 0.0084  0.0123 0.0250  0.0011 -0.0003 
 [-0.77] [-0.39]  [-1.23] [-1.72]  [0.35] [1.54]  [1.01] [1.45]  [0.60] [-0.27] 
CEO shareholding (×105) -0.7442*** 0.0212  -0.4105*** 0.0338  -0.1921*** -0.0015  0.2526** 0.1174***  -0.0328*** 0.0022 
 [-3.62] [0.40]  [-3.16] [0.75]  [-3.15] [-0.22]  [2.12] [3.33]  [-2.98] [0.85] 
Adj. R2 0.47 0.41  0.42 0.40  0.36 0.28  0.43 0.48  0.48 0.33 
N 1108 645   1108 645   1108 645   1093 627   1092 626 
Notes: 
This table reports OLS regression results for high- versus low-megamerger banks. The sample banks are divided into high- and low-megamerger groups by the median dollar value of total 
megamerger transactions made by banks over the sample period. Intercepts and year dummies are included but suppressed for brevity. The dependent variables are in thousands of U.S. dollars. 
See the appendix for variable definitions. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 9 
Mergers and CEO Compensation in Industrial Firms 
 
  Panel A: CEO pay   Panel B: CEO pay sensitivity 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  [7] [8] [9] [10] 
  
Total 
compensation 
Total 
compensation 
Equity 
compensation 
Equity 
compensation 
Cash 
compensation 
Cash 
compensation 
  Delta Delta Vega Vega 
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
0.0409*** 0.0399*** 0.0296** 0.0224** 0.0115*** 0.0113***  0.0065*** 0.0063*** 0.0018** 0.0018** 
 [2.74] [2.71] [2.24] [2.17] [5.83] [5.85]  [2.80] [2.83] [2.18] [2.16] 
Assets acquired in 
megamergers ($ millions) 
0.1297***  0.1295***  0.0460***   0.0204**  0.0071***  
 [5.48]  [4.71]  [4.33]   [1.99]  [5.17]  
Assets acquired in all 
mergers ($ millions) 
 0.1512***  0.1015***  0.0461***   0.0284**  0.0088*** 
  [5.29]  [4.82]  [4.55]   [2.57]  [4.96] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
0.0207*  0.0226*  0.0067   0.0130***  0.0031***  
 [1.76]  [1.96]  [1.37]   [2.86]  [3.66]  
Non-merger growth  
($ millions) 
 0.0145  0.0079  0.0061   0.0111***  0.0027*** 
  [1.30]  [1.12]  [1.24]   [2.60]  [3.74] 
Change in firm value due to 
change in industry index 
($ millions) 
0.1007*** 0.0989*** 0.0901*** 0.0617*** 0.0198*** 0.0194***  0.0479*** 0.0474*** 0.0034*** 0.0033*** 
 [7.92] [8.06] [7.10] [7.64] [6.76] [6.67]  [8.87] [8.82] [4.93] [4.90] 
Change in firm value due to 
idiosyncratic change 
($ millions) 
0.0660*** 0.0652*** 0.0679*** 0.0383*** 0.0139*** 0.0138***  0.0540*** 0.0537*** 0.0015** 0.0014** 
 [5.79] [5.68] [5.15] [4.80] [4.00] [3.99]  [9.39] [9.24] [2.19] [2.04] 
Return on assets (×105) 0.0492*** 0.0493*** 0.0291*** 0.0262*** 0.0127*** 0.0127***  0.0156*** 0.0157*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 
 [12.63] [12.68] [7.96] [9.52] [12.27] [12.26]  [8.37] [8.37] [9.91] [9.93] 
Female CEO (×103) 0.3222 0.3202 0.4953 0.2917 -0.0482 -0.0490  -0.2022 -0.2021 -0.0073 -0.0073 
 [0.95] [0.95] [1.46] [1.25] [-0.74] [-0.75]  [-1.57] [-1.57] [-0.39] [-0.40] 
CEO duality (×103) 1.2330*** 1.2279*** 0.7317*** 0.6728*** 0.2399*** 0.2392***  0.1465*** 0.1452*** 0.0519*** 0.0516*** 
 [12.29] [12.31] [7.91] [9.85] [6.49] [6.48]  [3.69] [3.66] [9.20] [9.23] 
CEO age (×103) -0.0097 -0.0098 -0.0316*** -0.0264*** 0.0148*** 0.0148***  0.0010 0.0010 0.0002 0.0002 
 [-1.35] [-1.37] [-4.58] [-5.56] [3.63] [3.63]  [0.23] [0.22] [0.49] [0.46] 
CEO shareholding (×105) -0.1019*** -0.1016*** -0.0688*** -0.0656*** -0.0158*** -0.0158***  0.1256*** 0.1257*** -0.0028*** -0.0028*** 
 [-11.11] [-11.14] [-8.19] [-11.50] [-5.16] [-5.14]  [11.06] [11.07] [-4.75] [-4.78] 
Adj. R2 0.26 0.27 0.16 0.20 0.12 0.12  0.30 0.30 0.19 0.20 
N 28838 28838 28838 28838 28838 28838   27930 27930 27985 27985 
Notes: 
This table presents OLS regressions of CEO pay and pay sensitivity on merger growth and control variables in U.S. industrial firms. Intercepts, year dummies and industry dummies (Fama-French 
48 industry classification) are included in all regressions but suppressed for brevity. The dependent variables are in thousands of U.S. dollars. See the appendix for variable definitions. The t-
statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Are Banks Different from Industrial Firms (DiD Analysis) 
 
Panel A: DiD tests for CEO pay 
Estimated propensity score distributions: 
Propensity scores N Min P5 Median Mean P95 Max SD 
Bank 45 0.016 0.031 0.180 0.214 0.496 1.000 0.189 
Industrial 45 0.016 0.031 0.180 0.214 0.487 0.991 0.187 
Difference ̶ 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.028 0.036 0.008 
Post-matching mean differences: 
Variable Bank Industrial Difference t-statistic 
Total assets before megamergers ($ billions) 41.545 16.933 24.612 1.313 
Assets acquired in megamergers ($ billions) 2.843 1.947 0.896 0.641 
Growth above industry index -0.038 0.027 -0.065 -0.800 
Return on assets 0.025 0.004 0.020 1.210 
Female CEO 0.000 0.000 0.000                      ̶
CEO duality 0.711 0.667 0.044 0.451 
CEO age 57.067 56.667 0.400 0.347 
CEO shareholding 0.008 0.005 0.003 1.340 
Δ Total compensation ($ millions) 0.884 1.310 -0.426 -0.718 
Δ Equity compensation ($ millions) 0.778 0.712 0.066 0.137 
Δ Cash compensation ($ millions) 0.119 0.409 -0.291 -1.427 
DiD estimators: 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Mean difference before megamerger Mean difference after megamerger Mean DiD estimator 
  (Bank  ̶  Industrial) (Bank  ̶  Industrial) (after   ̶ before) 
Total compensation -729 24 753** 
 [-1.11] [0.03] [2.10] 
Equity compensation -421 -48 373* 
 [-1.61] [-0.15] [1.94] 
Cash compensation -114 -7 107 
  [-0.35] [-0.02] [0.67] 
Panel B: DiD tests for CEO pay sensitivity 
Estimated propensity score distributions: 
Propensity scores N Min P5 Median Mean P95 Max SD 
Bank 50 0.041 0.062 0.196 0.286 0.995 1.000 0.267 
Industrial 50 0.041 0.061 0.195 0.284 0.995 0.995 0.269 
Difference ̶ 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.038 0.081 0.015 
Post-matching mean differences: 
Variable Bank Industrial Difference t-statistic 
Total assets before megamergers ($ billions) 78.273 34.789 43.484 1.348 
Assets acquired in megamergers ($ billions) 3.753 2.243 1.510 1.133 
Growth above industry index -0.021 0.130 -0.150 -1.617 
Return on assets 0.023 0.010 0.013 1.348 
Female CEO 0.000 0.000 0.000                      ̶ 
CEO duality 0.640 0.580 0.060 0.610 
CEO age 57.520 56.960 0.560 0.449 
CEO shareholding 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.469 
Δ Delta ($ millions) 0.115 0.029 0.086 0.975 
Δ Vega ($ millions) 0.018 0.042 -0.024 -0.655 
DiD estimators: 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Mean difference before megamerger Mean difference after megamerger Mean DiD estimator 
  (Bank  ̶  Industrial) (Bank   ̶ Industrial) (after   ̶ before) 
Delta 299* 170 -129* 
 [1.76] [1.07] [-1.92] 
Vega 68 17 -51 
  [0.99] [0.27] [-1.49] 
Notes: 
This table tests whether the merger impact on CEO pay and pay sensitivity differs across banks and industrial firms. Bank 
megamergers (treatment) and industrial firm megamergers (control) are matched within the same year, using a one-to-one 
nearest neighbour propensity score matching with replacement. The DiD estimators are calculated in a five-year event window 
surrounding the megamerger completion year. The mean difference before (after) megamerger is computed by subtracting the 
mean of the control group from that of the treatment group over the period before (after) megamerger. The DiD estimator is 
then computed by subtracting the between-group mean difference before megamerger from that after megamerger. The t-
statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are given in brackets, testing whether the mean difference is equal 
to 0. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The DiD estimators are 
reported in thousands of U.S. dollars. See the appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 11 
Global Financial Crisis 
 
Panel A: Banks 
  
Total 
compensation 
Equity 
compensation 
Cash 
compensation 
Delta Vega 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
1992 ̶ 2007      
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
0.0212*** 0.0104*** 0.0081*** 0.0017*** 0.0015*** 
 [6.49] [4.27] [8.51] [2.64] [4.94] 
Assets acquired in 
megamergers 
($ millions) 
0.3640* 0.2665* -0.0436** -0.0417** -0.0034 
 [1.90] [1.82] [-2.15] [-2.11] [-0.81] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
0.0111 0.0184*** -0.0006 0.0033 -0.0001 
 [1.41] [3.16] [-0.08] [1.49] [-0.26] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.53 0.42 0.52 0.33 0.60 
N 996 996 996 989 987 
2008      
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
0.0209** 0.0200** 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0003* 
 [2.35] [2.29] [0.50] [1.31] [-1.88] 
Assets acquired in 
megamergers 
($ millions) 
-0.2857* -0.2868* 0.0110** -0.0286* 0.0105*** 
 [-1.91] [-1.89] [2.39] [-1.90] [3.25] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
-0.0091 -0.0064 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0005 
 [-0.56] [-0.40] [-0.76] [0.73] [1.43] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.67 0.77 0.29 0.36 0.88 
N 103 103 103 100 100 
2009 ̶ 2014      
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
0.0059** 0.0052*** 0.0010 0.0004 0.0002 
 [2.61] [3.16] [1.57] [0.82] [1.11] 
Assets acquired in 
megamergers 
($ millions) 
0.8606*** 0.6515*** 0.1489*** -0.0235 0.0317*** 
 [5.24] [4.15] [5.72] [-0.72] [2.85] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
-0.0032 -0.0042 0.0001 0.0026*** 0.0007*** 
 [-0.85] [-1.45] [0.11] [3.60] [3.73] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.49 0.51 0.29 0.42 0.46 
N 653 653 653 631 631 
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Panel B: Matched industrial firms 
  
Total 
compensation 
Equity 
compensation 
Cash 
compensation 
Delta Vega 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
1992 ̶ 2007      
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
0.0281*** 0.0142*** 0.0090*** 0.0029*** 0.0009** 
 [6.25] [4.25] [4.32] [2.84] [2.42] 
Assets acquired in 
megamergers 
($ millions) 
0.2819** 0.2119** 0.0724* 0.0290* 0.0097** 
 [2.10] [2.02] [1.76] [1.87] [2.42] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
0.0211 0.0033 0.0061 0.0068 0.0011 
 [0.90] [0.23] [0.83] [1.21] [1.41] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.19 0.13 0.31 0.31 0.24 
N 996 996 996 989 987 
2008      
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
-0.2515* -0.1276*** -0.1434 -0.0014 -0.0020 
 [-1.71] [-2.83] [-1.51] [-0.10] [-0.84] 
Assets acquired in 
megamergers 
($ millions) 
1.1899** 0.6165*** 0.5937** -0.0208 0.0149** 
 [2.47] [3.14] [2.26] [-0.23] [2.41] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
0.8512 0.4607*** 0.4552 -0.0135 0.0082 
 [1.66] [2.74] [1.33] [-0.38] [1.14] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.28 0.27 0.35 0.09 0.13 
N 103 103 103 100 100 
2009 ̶ 2014      
Total assets at t 3̶ 
($ millions) 
0.0132** 0.0029 0.0061*** 0.0014 -0.0004* 
 [2.37] [0.65] [12.69] [1.53] [-1.65] 
Assets acquired in 
megamergers 
($ millions) 
0.1888** 0.1616*** 0.0129 0.0192 -0.0044 
 [2.42] [2.70] [0.89] [0.75] [-0.73] 
Non-megamerger growth 
($ millions) 
0.0053 0.0106 -0.0135*** 0.0076 0.0008 
 [0.18] [0.52] [-2.78] [1.27] [0.30] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.29 0.21 0.49 0.24 0.15 
N 653 653 653 631 631 
Notes: 
This table presents OLS regressions of CEO pay and pay sensitivity on megamerger growth and control variables in the pre-
crisis (1992 ̶2007), crisis (2008) and post-crisis (2009 ̶2014) periods. The sample contains banks in Panel A and matched 
industrial firms in Panel B. Banks and industrial firms are matched using a one-to-one nearest neighbour propensity score 
matching with replacement. Control variables, year dummies and intercepts are included in all regressions but suppressed for 
brevity. The dependent variables are in thousands of U.S. dollars. See the appendix for variable definitions. The t-statistics 
based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
